2009
DOI: 10.1007/s10869-009-9132-2
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Determinants of Partner Opportunism in Strategic Alliances: A Conceptual Framework

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Cited by 188 publications
(174 citation statements)
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“…The analysis of the benefits of coopetition draws its inspiration not only from theoretical foundations (transaction cost theory, game theory, and the resource-based approach), but also from cooperation experiences and strategic alliances (especially horizontal ones) [48,[68][69][70][71][72][73].…”
Section: Benefits Of Coopetitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The analysis of the benefits of coopetition draws its inspiration not only from theoretical foundations (transaction cost theory, game theory, and the resource-based approach), but also from cooperation experiences and strategic alliances (especially horizontal ones) [48,[68][69][70][71][72][73].…”
Section: Benefits Of Coopetitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, such a behavioral alignment implies the forgoing of short-term opportunism, which "refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson 1975: 9), and advantages in favor of common long-term objectives (Das and Rahman 2010;Wathne and Heide 2000). This implies that a cooperating firm makes its own business performance dependent on the future, as it is contingent on the behavior of its cooperation partner: Due to the temporal split between inputs given and outputs received resulting from the long-term character of the exchange relationship, the party that delivers first places itself in the precarious position of not receiving the expected counter-performance (Macneil 1980;Emerson 1962).…”
Section: Behavioral Coordination In Interfirm Cooperationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In transaction cost economics, a crucial mechanism in deterring opportunism is relational-specific investment (Williamson, 1985). As such investments cannot be transferred to alternative users, it makes the investing firm highly dependent on the partner to realize the full value of the investments and thus restrained from opportunistic behavior (Das & Rahman, 2010). What underlies these investments is a strong commitment to the relationship, without which partners will not be able to put themselves in such a locked-in situation (Handley & Benton, 2012).…”
Section: Risk and Trust: A Relation-based Viewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What underlies these investments is a strong commitment to the relationship, without which partners will not be able to put themselves in such a locked-in situation (Handley & Benton, 2012). Another relational factor in deterring opportunism is goal congruence (Das and Rahman, 2010), seeing the supply chain as a united whole rather than segmented entities (Mentzer et al, 2001). When partners' goals are not aligned, a partner firm trying to accomplish its own goals may behave opportunistically.…”
Section: Risk and Trust: A Relation-based Viewmentioning
confidence: 99%
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