Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

Abstract

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. DETERMINANTS OF THE DURATION OF EUROPEAN APPELLATE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN CARTEL CASESFlorian Smuda # , Patrice Bougette * and Kai Hüschelrath  September 2014 AbstractThe duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one-or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the firststage appellate court decision depends on the court's appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

Cartel Cases and the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union 2001 2015: A Quantitative Assessment

“…In fact, as revealed by Figure 19, the average duration not only started at a level roughly half of that of GC investigations but even shows further reductions in subsequent years. However, the fact that several cases are still pending either at the GC or the ECJ is again likely to change the respective more recent values as more and more final GC/ECJ decisions will become available (see, e.g., Smuda et al (2015) for an econometric analysis of the determinants of appellate court decisions in EU cartel cases).…”

An Empirical Assessment of the European Commission’s Cartel Prosecutions, 2010–2019

“…Although 79 percent of the Commission's Article 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU 101 decisions were appealed between 2000 and 2009, since 2010, the proportion had fallen to 57 percent of the decisions. 80 81. 2006 Guidelines on Fines, point 4.…”

The Impact of EU Cartel Policy Reforms on the Timing of Settlements in Private Follow-On Damages Disputes: An Empirical Assessment of Cases from 2001 to 2015

“…As an important implication of the clarity brought by the new Fine Guidelines the duration of appellate court proceedings reduced. According to Smuda et al (2014) the average duration of a first stage court investigation decreased by around 12 months and of a second stage appeal by 11 months. These mark substantial reductions given the average duration of 49-months for a first stage appeal and a 16-month duration for a second stage appeal.…”

“…The impact of the 2006 Fines Guidelines of the duration of court decision is based on an econometric model, introducing a dummy variable after its introduction. See Smuda et al (2014). Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html.…”