Determinist Deliberations

Abstract

Many incompatibilists, including most prominently Peter Van Inwagen, have argued that deliberation presupposes a belief in libertarian freedom. They therefore suggest that deliberating determinists must have inconsistent beliefs: the belief they profess in determinism, as well as the belief, manifested in their deliberation, that determinism is false. In response, compatibilists (and others) have advanced alternative construals of the belief in freedom presupposed by deliberation, as well as cases designed to show that determinists can deliberate without inconsistency. I argue that the compatibilist case requires a convincing demonstration not merely that belief in determinism is consistent with deliberation, but also that such a belief does not place great psychological strain on agents, and that cases so far advanced have not succeeded in showing this. I then present a case designed to show that agents can accept determinism and deliberate, without inconsistent beliefs and without psychological strain.

Deliberation Incompatibilism

“…In other words, a determinist deliberator who has the latter belief can consistently deliberate, even if she lacks a belief in the causal openness of her deliberative alternatives. Neil Levy (2006) has recently illustrated a version of this idea by borrowing the predictor from Newcomb's problem. Imagine that Sally, who finds herself in the two–door situation, knows the predictor is able to predict with 100% accuracy which door she will leave by.…”

“…Can she consistently deliberate about which door to leave by under these circumstances? Levy argues that she can. This, he claims, is because she believes that which door she will leave by is “sensitive to the upshot of her deliberative processes” (2006, 457).…”

“…According to Coffman and Warfield, van Inwagen “conceive[s] of deliberation as a ‘trying to choose’ or ‘trying to decide’ what to do that occurs before action but after reasons for various actions have been weighed and evaluated (but have not decisively favored one course of action over all others)” (Ib., 28). Although I believe this formulation captures something important in van Inwagen's notion of deliberation, it invites the following natural objection: deliberation is usually used to refer to the weighing and evaluating of reasons itself, not something that happens after the weighing and evaluating of reasons (Levy 2006, 458). How can you go on deliberating about something if you really believe that weighing and evaluating your reasons would not take you any further?…”