This chapter describes several candidate mechanisms that might explain the binding of distributed macroscopic patterns of neuronal activities into a coherent whole. According to current findings, this problem is still unresolved and represents a fundamental problem in neuroscience related to brain coding and integration of distributed neural activities during processes related to perception, cognition, and memory (the "binding problem"). The theory of feature binding originated in the concept of distributed coding and states that neurons involved in the processing of a single object will tend to synchronize firing. This neural activity occurs synchronously across brain regions and likely underlies the integration of diverse brain activities. Together, these findings indicate that the solution to the binding problem may lie in the fundamental problem of consciousness in modern neuroscience. The predominant opinion is that consciousness emerges from a dynamical nucleus of persisting reverberation and interactions of neural groups. Other approaches to the binding problem include nonconventional hypotheses related to various physical theories, such as the complexity theory and the chaos theory.According to a recent growing body of evidence, the neural correlate of consciousness is related to the processing of distributed information that is represented by integration through levels of neural synchronization among multiple brain regions, which is in turn related to large-scale integration, or "binding." A seminal contribution to discussions about mechanisms of large-scale integration was made by Crick and Koch (1992, 2003), who proposed that the problem of binding cannot simply be resolved as a simple consequence of synchronization among large groups of neurons. As a basis for this opinion they emphasize the binding problem of distributed information represented by different modalities (such as form, motion, color, smell, sound). Processing information related to the perceived object produces synchronous activities in separate areas of the brain, but there is no evidence of the spatial convergence in the brain that would represent the neural correlate of consciousness. The hypothetical center for information convergence was termed "Cartesian theater" (Crick and Koch 1992; Dennett 1991), but recent neuroscience has not located a distinct place in which information distributed in the brain comes together. Recent findings suggest that a candidate mechanism for the integration