1968
DOI: 10.1177/002242786800500202
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Deterrence and Marginal Groups

Abstract: The critical importance of the criminal law as a threatening mechanism is restricted to those who must be threatened in order to secure their compliance. In regard to most "serious" crimes, the socialization process rather than the direct threat of a par ticular legal penalty keeps most people law abiding. Yet, in both the discussion of deterrence and the interpretation of movements in crime rates, this is often overlooked. The theoretical model dealing with "marginal groups" proposed here is designed to focus… Show more

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Cited by 48 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…This is an especially important finding because it coincides with a previous finding by Pogarsky (2002), based on a college student sample, indicating that for some subset of offenders, deterrence and sanction threats are considered and employed in a cost-calculus decision-making (see also Fagan & Piquero, 2007;Loughran, Piquero, Fagan, & Mulvey, in press). It is also consistent with the notion that deterrence may work best on so-called "marginal offenders"-those for whom crime is not compelled by strong motivation nor precluded by strong inhibitions (Andenaes, 1974;Pogarsky, 2007;Zimring & Hawkins, 1968). Our finding that perceived sanction certainty has a deterrent effect within this sample of serious juvenile offenders is also consistent with both qualitative work on serious offenders such as gang members, long-time burglars, and with perceptual deterrence research which indicates that even those that would be considered "impulsive" or low in self-control consider to some extent and are affected by the long-term consequences of their actions (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;Shover, 1996;Wright et al, 2004;Wright & Decker, 1994).…”
Section: Differential Marginal Effects Of Changes In Risksupporting
confidence: 77%
“…This is an especially important finding because it coincides with a previous finding by Pogarsky (2002), based on a college student sample, indicating that for some subset of offenders, deterrence and sanction threats are considered and employed in a cost-calculus decision-making (see also Fagan & Piquero, 2007;Loughran, Piquero, Fagan, & Mulvey, in press). It is also consistent with the notion that deterrence may work best on so-called "marginal offenders"-those for whom crime is not compelled by strong motivation nor precluded by strong inhibitions (Andenaes, 1974;Pogarsky, 2007;Zimring & Hawkins, 1968). Our finding that perceived sanction certainty has a deterrent effect within this sample of serious juvenile offenders is also consistent with both qualitative work on serious offenders such as gang members, long-time burglars, and with perceptual deterrence research which indicates that even those that would be considered "impulsive" or low in self-control consider to some extent and are affected by the long-term consequences of their actions (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;Shover, 1996;Wright et al, 2004;Wright & Decker, 1994).…”
Section: Differential Marginal Effects Of Changes In Risksupporting
confidence: 77%
“…(Zimring and Hawkins 1968) Control theory is currently one of the most, if not the most, popular theoretical perspectives in criminology (e.g. Briar and Piliavin 1965, Gottfredson and Hirchi 1990, Hirschi 1969, Reiss Jr. 1951.…”
Section: The Role Of Controlsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This led to more specific inquiries, for example, into the relative deterrent effects of the certainty and severity of punishment (Claster, 1967;Gibbs, 1968;Jensen, 1969;Klepper & Nagin, 1989;Paternoster, 1987;Teevan, 1976;Waldo & Chiricos, 1972), and extralegal sources of conformity (Bishop, 1984a(Bishop, , 1984bGrasmick & McLaughlin, 1978;Meier & Johnson, 1977;Tittle, 1980;Zimring & Hawkins, 1968). Most recently, recognizing that humans are only "boundedly rational," criminologists have investigated how decision shortcuts or biases affect the deterrence process (Casey & Scholz, 1991;Kinsey, Grasmick & Smith, 1991;Lattimore, Baker, & Witte, 1992;Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003;Scheider, 2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%