Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

Abstract

The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour--unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters--in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

“…It often lowers the average income in Public Good games, despite raising the average level of contributions. In games of trust, or games involving rewards, adding the threat of punishment can decrease the menaced player's willingness to cooperate [65]. In a particularly elegant set of experiments, it has been shown that, if players of a Public Good game are offered before each round the choice between the versions with or without Punishment, many tend first to shun negative incentives.…”

Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism

“…The modified versions of the Core model are applied to the analysis of human behavior in the settings of two well known lab experiments -the Trust Game of Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and the Control Game 21 by Falk and Kosfeld [2006], which are described in detail below.…”

“…For instance, providing additional incentives can, in contrast with standard models with selfish actors, lead to lower levels of performance and intentions seem to matter, according to Fehr and Rockenbach [2003], Falk and Kosfeld [2006] and many others 1 .…”

“…the Core Model. Section 4 introduces the extrinsic incentives in the Core Model and deals with two altered versions of it, which match the settings of the well known lab experiments -the Trust Game with a possibility of a fine by Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and the "Control Game" by Falk and Kosfeld [2006]. I show that there is a unifying framework for the Core Model and its two extensions with the same mechanism of motivation crowding out.…”

Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging

“…Such so-called 'peer punishment' can be effective under certain conditions (Fehr and 487 Gächter, 2000). However, it can easily be subverted by asocial punishment, not directed 488 against the defectors, but rather against the cooperators (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Denant-489 Boemont et al, 2007;Herrmann et al, 2008;Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 490 2012). While the self-justice involved in peer punishment may be important for the ancestral 491 establishment of cooperation, it is not normally used in developed societies to promote 492 cooperation (Guala, 2010).…”