Development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin

Altinbilek, Doğan

doi:10.1080/07900620310001635584

Cited by 122 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Most of the world's largest and disputed transnational river basins has been studied from this perspective, exploring the potential for a more efficient water management at a systemwide scale: the Nile [e.g., Guariso and Whittington, 1987;Wu and Whittington, 2006;Block and Strzepek, 2010], the Zambezi [e.g., Gandolfi et al, 1997;Tilmant et al, 2010, and the Euphrates-Tigris [e.g., Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000;Altinbilek, 2004].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the value of cooperation and information exchange in large water resources systems by agent‐based optimization

Giuliani

Castelletti

2013

Water Resources Research

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[1] Many large-scale water resources systems, especially in transboundary contexts, are characterized by the presence of several and conflicting interests and managed by multiple, institutionally independent decision makers. These systems are often studied adopting a centralized approach based on the assumption of full cooperation and information exchange among the involved parties. Such a perspective is conceptually interesting to quantify the best achievable performance but might have little practical impact given the real political and institutional setting. In this work, we propose a novel decision-analytic framework based on multiagent systems to model and analyze different levels of cooperation and information exchange among multiple decision makers. The Zambezi River basin is used as a case study. According to the proposed agent-based optimization approach, each agent represents a decision maker, whose decisions are defined by an explicit optimization problem considering only the agent's local interests. The economic value of information exchange is estimated comparing a noncooperative setting, where agents act independently, with the first basic level of cooperation, i.e., coordination, characterized by full information exchange. The economic value of cooperation is also estimated by comparison with the ideal, fully cooperative management of the system. Results show that coordination, obtained with complete information exchange, allows the downstream agents to better adapt to the upstream behaviors. The impact of information exchange depends on the objective considered, and we show coordination to be particularly beneficial to environmental interests.Citation: Giuliani, M., and A. Castelletti (2013), Assessing the value of cooperation and information exchange in large water resources systems by agent-based optimization, Water Resour. Res., 49,[3912][3913][3914][3915][3916][3917][3918][3919][3920][3921][3922][3923][3924][3925][3926]

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the value of cooperation and information exchange in large water resources systems by agent‐based optimization

Giuliani

Castelletti

2013

Water Resources Research

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“…The construction of the major development project known as the Southeastern Anatolia Project or Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) of Turkey has increased dispute among the riparians since the early 1970s (Kolars 1994;Zawahri 2006;Zentner 2010). The GAP is expected to generate 7500 megawatts of electricity from 22 dams and irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land (Altinbilek 2004) that are expected to consume 52% of the water of the Euphrates and 14.1% of the Tigris (Tomanbay 2000). For more details about this project, see (Bagis 1989;Kolars and Mitchell 1991;Bilen 1994;Kolars 1994;Altinbilek 1997Altinbilek , 2004.…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The GAP is expected to generate 7500 megawatts of electricity from 22 dams and irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land (Altinbilek 2004) that are expected to consume 52% of the water of the Euphrates and 14.1% of the Tigris (Tomanbay 2000). For more details about this project, see (Bagis 1989;Kolars and Mitchell 1991;Bilen 1994;Kolars 1994;Altinbilek 1997Altinbilek , 2004. Political disputes among the riparian states lead to serious tensions among them to the point that, in 1975, Syria and Iraq came very close to a full-scale war when Syria blocked the water flow of the Euphrates River (Schulz 1995).…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Mianabadi

Mostert

Pande

et al. 2015

Water Resour Manage

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One significant problem of transboundary river basins causing various challenges and disputes throughout the world is that because of increasing water resource variability and consumption, the water demand often exceeds water availability. Hence, one of the main challenges in transboundary river basin management is how to allocate the available water among the riparian states equitably and reasonably. In this study, we propose a novel weighted bankruptcy solution method to cope with the problem of demands or Bclaims^exceeding resources or Bassets^. Certain desirable key properties of the proposed method are provided. Furthermore, we investigate its application to the Tigris River, a shared river among Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as a real case. The available water is allocated under two different situations: homogeneous and heterogeneous group. We use the Shapley Value and compare the solution with other allocation methods applied in this study. The results suggest that this new rule may facilitate negotiation in solving conflict over the allocation of water in transboundary river basins.

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“…While the dead reserve capacity has no use for energy generation and water distribution, the active one is critical for intertemporal allocations. Those active reservoir capacities are almost completely available in Turkey and partially available in Syria and Iraq [Altınbilek, 1997[Altınbilek, , 2004; United Nations Environment Programme, 2001]. In Turkey, the total active storage capacity is 63.3 Bm 3 .…”

Section: A7 Additional Data and Assumptions Needed For The Itetrbmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition possibility of riparian countries via game theory and fuzzy logic models

Küçükmehmetoğlu

Şen

Özger

2010

Water Resources Research

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[1] In many respects, water resources allocation problems have fuzzy characteristics owing to uncertainty and imprecision not only as numerical data but also as linguistic data, in addition to the political nature of resource allocation. All classical techniques require numerical data and cannot treat linguistic data, but fuzzy inference systems (FIS) can deal with both types of data. Hence, it is suitable to reflect the dynamic nature of country benefits, reflective variations in the main drainage and subdrainage basin flows, and various system parameters in search of a coalition among a few riparian countries. The size of core, which is generated from a series of linear programming (LP) optimization models and game theory concepts, shows the potential extra benefit advantage of being in grand coalition to all parties, but it does not provide a sufficient condition to assemble a robust coalition unless an agreeable allocation scheme or principle is provided. In this respect, there is a fuzzy link between being in the grand coalition and percentage share received from a core. Hence, a proper FIS is proposed, and the necessary steps are developed with the Shapley value and the core as game theory methods, which provide a methodological base in the evaluation of possible allocation schemes among the parties. The application of the methodology is presented to search for coalition possibilities among the riparian countries: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Basic results are generated over the application of the Inter-Temporal Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model, which is an optimization model for the allocation of scarce water resources considering agricultural and urban uses, energy generation, and conveyance costs in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.Citation: Kucukmehmetoglu, M., Z. Şen, and M. Özger (2010), Coalition possibility of riparian countries via game theory and fuzzy logic models, Water Resour. Res., 46, W12528,

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Development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin

Cited by 122 publications

References 4 publications

Assessing the value of cooperation and information exchange in large water resources systems by agent‐based optimization

Assessing the value of cooperation and information exchange in large water resources systems by agent‐based optimization

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Coalition possibility of riparian countries via game theory and fuzzy logic models

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