Development of a security vulnerability assessment process for the RAMCAP chemical sector

Moore, David A.; Fuller, Brad; Hazzan, Marc; Jones, Jim

doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2006.06.133

Cited by 39 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…For example, the Swedish Municipal Vulnerability Analysis methodology (Hallin, Nilsson, & Olofsson, 2004; Nilsson & Becker, 2009) starts its risk and vulnerability assessments by asking municipal managers to name and rank what they hold as valuable and worth being protected. Similarly, the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection methodology (ASME Innovative Technologies Institute, 2006; Cox & Anthony, 2008; Moore, Fuller, Hazzan, & Jones 2007) begins with characterizing assets. More generally, Mercer, Dominey‐howes, Kelman, and Lloyd (2007) suggest that the approach to disaster risk reductions should encompass not only the ‘hazard’ but even why people are vulnerable in the first place.…”

Section: On Risk Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizational Risk as it Derives from What Managers Value: A Practice‐Based Approach to Risk Assessment

Corvellec

2010

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

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Two observations serve as starting points for this paper. First, conventional risk assessment techniques provide sophisticated ways to identify and estimate hazards, but eschew the fact that there is no risk unless something of value is considered to be at stake. Second, what managers consider as being of value follows from how they organize their managerial practice. Based on a case study of a Swedish public transportation administration, a claim is presented that organizational risk conceptions derive primarily, although not exclusively, from what managers consider being of value both in and for their organizational practice. In particular, it is suggested to begin the risk assessment process with a critical appraisal of what managers hold as being of value and why.

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Section: On Risk Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizational Risk as it Derives from What Managers Value: A Practice‐Based Approach to Risk Assessment

Corvellec

2010

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

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“…(1) Threat analysis, especially for quantification of the threat, is a considerable challenge since it requires a multitude of data and knowledge, and modeling the motivations, intents, characteristics, capabilities, and tactics of adversaries (Baybutt, 2017;Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002). Vulnerability analysis requires a detailed understanding of the design and operation of installations and the threat information (Matteini et al, 2018;Moore et al, 2007;Staalduinen et al, 2016). Security measures can improve the capability of installations against attacks but also may change the attackers' strategies because of the intelligent character of the adversaries (Cox, 2009;Cox, 2008;Powell, 2007).…”

Section: R F T V C mentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating safety and security resources to protect chemical industrial parks from man-made domino effects: A dynamic graph approach

Chen

Reniers

Khakzad

2019

Reliability Engineering & System Safety

112

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Chemical industrial parks are susceptible to domino effects triggered by intentional attacks.Previous research on security risk management in chemical and process industries has mainly focused on using security measures to prevent intentional attacks, neglecting the effects of safety barriers. Safety barriers are able to reduce the potential consequences and decrease the attractiveness of chemical industrial parks to terrorists who aim to maximize the damage. From a systematic perspective, the potential consequence of intentional attacks is defined as the expected loss which is the sum-product of damage probability and consequence of all installations. A consequence-based methodology including a Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment Graph (DVSG) model is proposed to integrate safety and security resources for reducing the risk of intentional attacks. The DVAG model is developed based on dynamic graphs, considering the effects of security measures, safety barriers, and emergency response. This methodology can quickly assess the consequences and damage probabilities of all possible intentional attacks so as to mitigate the risk via evaluation and allocation of security measures and safety barriers.

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“…The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Innovative Technology Institute developed a guideline on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) for the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [7]. RAMCAP is a framework for analysing and managing the risks associated with terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure assets in the United States.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security vulnerability assessment of gas pipelines using Discrete-time Bayesian network

Fakhravar

Khakzad

Reniers

et al. 2017

Process Safety and Environmental Protection

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Development of a security vulnerability assessment process for the RAMCAP chemical sector

Cited by 39 publications

References 0 publications

Organizational Risk as it Derives from What Managers Value: A Practice‐Based Approach to Risk Assessment

Organizational Risk as it Derives from What Managers Value: A Practice‐Based Approach to Risk Assessment

Integrating safety and security resources to protect chemical industrial parks from man-made domino effects: A dynamic graph approach

Security vulnerability assessment of gas pipelines using Discrete-time Bayesian network

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