Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Exploring the role of salient distracting clinical features in the emergence of diagnostic errors and the mechanisms through which reflection counteracts mistakes

“…Findings seem consistent with studies on saliency in perception research which show that attention tends to be directed, without the intention of the observer, towards certain features of a task20–22 either because they are perceptually salient or because they become salient to the individual due to his/her prior experience with similar problems 20 25. It is reasonable to suppose that some features in a clinical case, even when irrelevant to the present problem, would become salient for a physician who had previous patients with similar histories or when the clinical significance or potential seriousness of a certain finding is known.…”

The illusion of replacement in research into the development of thinking biases: the case of the conjunction fallacy

“…Most strikingly, when frequency information was presented, children switched from a tendency to commit the fallacy to a tendency to avoid the fallacy, which did not happen in the case of adults, unless the relevance of probability information was specifically highlighted to them. Osman and Stavy (2006) discussed the role of bottom-up and top-down saliency in people's interpretation of tasks, where bottom-up saliency is based on the objective characteristics of presented stimuli, and top-down saliency is based on participants' knowledge of (and previous experiences with) the stimuli. Our findings suggest that there is a developmental shift from childhood to adulthood from a dominant reliance on bottom-up, to a dominant reliance on topdown saliency.…”

Dual Processes in the Psychology of Mathematics Education and Cognitive Psychology

“…Skill-based reasoning acquired through instruction might act as a heuristic process but seems to differ from other heuristic processes in its relation to consciousness. Osman and Stavy [2006] contrasted skill-based automatic processes with implicit processes, arguing that people are aware of the procedures they apply in skill-based processes. Evans acknowledged that different types of heuristic processes relate to consciousness differently: 'it seems that there are implicit processes that were once conscious, others that were never conscious but deliver a product to consciousness, and still others that influence our behaviour without ever being conscious in any sense at all' [Evans, 2006a, p. 4].…”