Developmental Constitutionalism and the Fourth Branch: Ghana’s Independent Constitutional Bodies and the Redress of Poverty and Inequality

Abstract

Ghana’s Constitution has long emphasized the importance of equality, democracy, human rights and development. These principles are entrenched in a separation of powers framework that includes independent constitutional bodies that operate semi-autonomously from the tripartite executive, legislative and judicial branches. As part of a symposium on so-called ‘fourth branch’ institutions that provide redress for poverty and inequality, this article explores two institutions: the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the National Development Planning Commission. The first is a 30-year-old national human rights institution, which monitors and investigates alleged violations of human rights, corruption and the misappropriation of public moneys, and provides redress, partly through its increasing focus on economic and social rights and the claims of the most vulnerable, including women, children and persons with disabilities. The second, currently executive body, is the subject of current calls for constitutional reform in Ghana. These reforms would entrench national development planning to enhance features of autonomy, technical capacity and partisan independence. As such, these proposals offer a distinctive and yet also paradigm-defying model of fourth branch arrangements in developmental constitutionalism, raising questions about the usurpation of policymaking and the deficits of democracy that are commonly raised against courts, international financial institutions or other international economic arrangements.