Deviance in organizational decision making: using unanimous decision rules to promote the positive effects and alleviate the negative effects of deviance

Rijnbout, Jasmine S.; McKimmie, Blake M.

doi:10.1111/jasp.12238

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The importance of discussing task-relevant information during group decision making in reaching accurate decisions has been established by several seminal studies of realistic group deliberations. For example, Kaplan and Miller’s work [ 24 – 26 ] demonstrates that shifts in group decisions are driven by group members sharing task-relevant information (see also [ 27 ]), particularly when the group is required to reach unanimity [ 26 ]. Yet these studies did not distinguish between task-relevant information focused on central versus peripheral information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual versus group decision making: Jurors’ reliance on central and peripheral information to evaluate expert testimony

2017

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To investigate dual-process persuasion theories in the context of group decision making, we studied low and high need-for-cognition (NFC) participants within a mock trial study. Participants considered plaintiff and defense expert scientific testimony that varied in argument strength. All participants heard a cross-examination of the experts focusing on peripheral information (e.g., credentials) about the expert, but half were randomly assigned to also hear central information highlighting flaws in the expert’s message (e.g., quality of the research presented by the expert). Participants rendered pre- and post-group-deliberation verdicts, which were considered “scientifically accurate” if the verdicts reflected the strong (versus weak) expert message, and “scientifically inaccurate” if they reflected the weak (versus strong) expert message. For individual participants, we replicated studies testing classic persuasion theories: Factors promoting reliance on central information (i.e., central cross-examination, high NFC) improved verdict accuracy because they sensitized individual participants to the quality discrepancy between the experts’ messages. Interestingly, however, at the group level, the more that scientifically accurate mock jurors discussed peripheral (versus central) information about the experts, the more likely their group was to reach the scientifically accurate verdict. When participants were arguing for the scientifically accurate verdict consistent with the strong expert message, peripheral comments increased their persuasiveness, which made the group more likely to reach the more scientifically accurate verdict.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual versus group decision making: Jurors’ reliance on central and peripheral information to evaluate expert testimony

2017

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“…2 Sah and Stiglitz (1988) and Nitzan (1997, 2001) give the exact conditions under which the unanimity rule is preferred to all other voting rules. See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Romme (2004), Ali et al (2008), and Rijnbout and McKimmie (2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar

Danziger

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Romme (2004), Ali et al (2008), and Rijnbout and McKimmie (2014). 1 into committees that make dichotomous decisions using the unanimity rule.…”

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confidence: 99%

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

Ben-Yashar

Danziger

2016

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric CommitteesIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. ABSTRACT The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric CommitteesThis paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.JEL Classification: D71

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Deviance in organizational decision making: using unanimous decision rules to promote the positive effects and alleviate the negative effects of deviance

Cited by 5 publications

References 33 publications

Individual versus group decision making: Jurors’ reliance on central and peripheral information to evaluate expert testimony

Individual versus group decision making: Jurors’ reliance on central and peripheral information to evaluate expert testimony

The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

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