Device Attacker Models: Fact and Fiction

Yu, Jiangshan; Ryan, Mark

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…While PFS considers how to protect the past communications, PCS considers how to automatically reinstate and re-establish the secure communication channels, for future communications. This security property has so far been considered only in the specific scenario of secure messaging [135], and only limited works [133,134] are available. In particular, we consider that when anchor has been compromised by an attacker (e.g., through the exploitation of software vulnerabilities), and has been reinstated by the operator (e.g., by applying software patches and rebuilding servers), the system should have a way to automatically re-establish secure communications between anchor and all other participants, without having to reinstate these components (controllers and forwarding devices in this case, whose shared secrets became compromised).…”

Section: Hardening Anchormentioning

confidence: 99%

ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks

Kreutz,

Yu,

Ramos

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Software-defined networking (SDN) decouples the control and data planes of traditional networks, logically centralizing the functional properties of the network in the SDN controller. While this centralization brought advantages such as a faster pace of innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional architectures against different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been concerned with the functional side, despite some specific works concerning non-functional properties like 'security' or 'dependability'. Though addressing the latter in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way, may work, it will most likely lead to efficiency and effectiveness problems.We claim that the enforcement of non-functional properties as a pillar of SDN robustness calls for a systemic approach. We further advocate, for its materialization, the re-iteration of the successful formula behind SDN -'logical centralization'. As a general concept, we propose anchor, a subsystem architecture that promotes the logical centralization of non-functional properties. To show the effectiveness of the concept, we focus on 'security' in this paper: we identify the current security gaps in SDNs and we populate the architecture middleware with the appropriate security mechanisms, in a global and consistent manner. Essential security mechanisms provided by anchor include reliable entropy and resilient pseudo-random generators, and protocols for secure registration and association of SDN devices.We claim and justify in the paper that centralizing such mechanisms is key for their effectiveness, by allowing us to: define and enforce global policies for those properties; reduce the complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services; foster interoperability of the non-functional property enforcement mechanisms; and promote the security and resilience of the architecture itself. We discuss design and implementation aspects, and we prove and evaluate our algorithms and mechanisms, including the formalisation of the main protocols and the verification of their core security properties using the Tamarin prover.

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Section: Hardening Anchormentioning

confidence: 99%

ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks

Kreutz,

Yu,

Ramos

et al. 2017

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…For each website, the user's token picks a different, strong and totally random password of generous length 11 and remembers it. The user never has to type it or even see it 12 . The strong password 8 This corresponds to having different passwords for the different site, but without Emily having to remember them because the Pico does that for her.…”

Section: The Core Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%

Pico Without Public Keys

Stajano

Christianson

Lomas

et al. 2015

Security Protocols XXIII

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Abstract. Pico is a user authentication system that does not require remembering secrets. It is based on a personal handheld token that holds the user's credentials and that is unlocked by a "personal aura" generated by digital accessories worn by the owner. The token, acting as prover, engages in a public-key-based authentication protocol with the verifier. What would happen to Pico if success of the mythical quantum computer meant secure public key primitives were no longer available, or if for other reasons such as energy consumption we preferred not to deploy them? More generally, what would happen under those circumstances to user authentication on the web, which relies heavily on public key cryptography through HTTPS/TLS? Although the symmetric-key-vs-public-key debate dates back to the 1990s, we note that the problematic aspects of public key deployment that were identified back then are still ubiquitous today. In particular, although public key cryptography is widely deployed on the web, revocation still doesn't work. We discuss ways of providing desirable properties of public-key-based user authentication systems using symmetric-key primitives and tamperevident tokens. In particular, we present a protocol through which a compromise of the user credentials file at one website does not require users to change their credentials at that website or any other. We also note that the current prototype of Pico, when working in compatibility mode through the Pico Lens (i.e. with websites that are unaware of the Pico protocols), doesn't actually use public key cryptography, other than that implicit in TLS. With minor tweaks we adopt this as the native mode for Pico, dropping public key cryptography and achieving much greater deployability without any noteworthy loss in security.

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Fault Independence in Blockchain

2023

2023 53rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)

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Device Attacker Models: Fact and Fiction

Cited by 4 publications

References 9 publications

ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks

ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks

Pico Without Public Keys

Fault Independence in Blockchain

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