Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition

Duncombe, Matthew; Novaes, Catarina Dutilh

doi:10.1080/01445340.2015.1086624

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…159a18–22). (Duncombe & Dutilh Novaes, 2016 , p. 3) Notice here the (seemingly) ad hominem character of these dialogues: questioner wants to refute answerer (or answerer’s position), whereas answerer tries to defend herself by maintaining the consistency of her discursive commitments (Castelnérac and Marion 2009 ), thus avoiding refutation. They aim for different goals, and are ‘adversaries’ in the sense that these different goals cannot simultaneously obtain (Dutilh Novaes 2021 ).…”

Section: Refutation In Ancient Dialecticmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 4 There are a number of detailed reconstructions of the basic features of this practice in the literature (Castelnérac and Marion 2009 , 2013 ; Fink 2012 ). Scholars disagree on how best to understand the concept of dialectic, even in the restricted context of ancient Greek thought (Duncombe and Dutilh Novaes 2016 ). It is important to bear in mind that Socratic dialectic, as depicted in Plato’s early dialogues, is different from the notion of dialectic that emerges from Plato’s later dialogues.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

Novaes

2022

Argumentation

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

show abstract

Section: Refutation In Ancient Dialecticmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

Novaes

2022

Argumentation

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Yet in comparing reflective equilibrium to the Aristotelian dialectic, Hartman ignores a crucial difference between the two. Aristotelian dialectic proceeds from widely held and/or reputable opinions ( endoxa ) to discover the first principles of a given science (Duncombe & Dutilh Novaes, 2016). To have the episteme of a thing implies knowledge of its causes (Greco, 2014); in contrast, nous is an intuitive knowledge of first principles, which can be approached through the dialectical method but cannot be justified by anything outside itself (Irwin, 1990).…”

Section: The Role Of Deliberation In Moral Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hartman's quandary: Reconciling pluralism and realism for virtue ethics in business

Bhuyan

Chakraborty

2022

Business Ethics Env & Resp

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is considerable consensus on the idea that Aristotelian virtue ethics advocates moral realism. In numerous works, the well-known business ethicist Edwin Hartman grapples with reconciling the unitary vision of life that a particular kind of moral realism advocates and the pluralist respect for diverse cultures and belief systems that comprise our world. This paper closely follows Hartman's efforts to reconcile his liberal values with his guarded support for Aristotelian moral realism. We argue that the realist interpretation of Aristotle's function argument can be employed to strengthen Hartman's critique of the concept of Homo economicus, which is often posited by its proponents and critics alike as the only viable position for a business manager.Drawing from Aristotle, the paper posits a novel notion of species-excellence as the ultimate telos of human life and an objective basis for a critique of Homo economicus.

show abstract

“…Initial inspiration for the account came from the historical emergence of regimented canons for deductive reasoning in ancient Greece, both in logic (Castelnérac and Marion, ) and in mathematics (Netz, ) . In both cases, argumentative practices provided the background for the emergence of regimented theories of deductive argumentation, which in turn eventually led to the birth of fully‐fledged systems such as Aristotelian syllogistic (Kapp, ; Duncombe and Dutilh Novaes, ) and Euclidean mathematics. And while they have undergone transformations through the centuries, these systems have retained a number of dialogical features—so much so that a satisfactory philosophical account of them cannot bypass the dialogical component .…”

Section: A Dialogical Account Of Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paradoxes and Structural Rules From a Dialogical Perspective

Novaes

French

2018

Philosophical Issues

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, substructural approaches to paradoxes have become quite popular. But whatever restrictions on structural rules we may want to enforce, it is highly desirable that such restrictions be accompanied by independent philosophical motivation, not directly related to paradoxes. Indeed, while these recent developments have shed new light on a number of issues pertaining to paradoxes, it seems that we now have even more open questions than before, in particular two very pressing ones: what (independent) motivations do we have (if any) for restrictions on structural rules, and what to make of the plurality of new logics emerging from these restrictions, i.e. how to 'choose' among the different options. In this paper, we address these two questions from the perspective of a dialogical conception of logic that we've been advocating in recent years. We will argue that dialogical interpretations of structural rules, that is, as rules determining specific properties of the dialogues in question, provide a conveniently neutral framework to adjudicate between the different substructural proposals that have been made in the literature on paradoxes.

show abstract

Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition

Abstract: Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition. Introduction Sweet Analytics, 'tis thou hast ravish'd me, Bene disserere est finis logices.

Cited by 8 publications

References 18 publications

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

Hartman's quandary: Reconciling pluralism and realism for virtue ethics in business

Paradoxes and Structural Rules From a Dialogical Perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About