Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure

Abstract

International audienceThis work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. [2016], model games in which there is a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is either accepted or rejected. In a game with a coalition structure, it is supposed that players organize themselves into disjoint coalitions wich are defined a priori. We extend the well-known Owen index (Owen [1977]) and Banzhaf-Owen index (Owen [1981]) to this class of games. A full characterization of these power indices is provided

Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval

“…Secondly, following the works of Tchantcho, Diffo Lambo, and Pongou (2008), we can also qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters with the three public good indices. Another interesting direction is the extension of public good indices to (j, 2) games which take into account the different a priori relationships between players in the spirit of Alonso-Meijide et al 2010and Courtin, Nganmeni, and Tchantcho (2017).…”