2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2536586
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Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…For example,Gallagher and Grundfest (2014) argue that the evidence on benefits of classified boards requires greater involvement of proxy advisors and institutional investors in voting on matters related to classified boards.3Comment and Schwert (1995) find no evidence that poison pills or state-level laws reduce takeover likelihood.4 SeeGompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) for G-andBebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) for E-Index details.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example,Gallagher and Grundfest (2014) argue that the evidence on benefits of classified boards requires greater involvement of proxy advisors and institutional investors in voting on matters related to classified boards.3Comment and Schwert (1995) find no evidence that poison pills or state-level laws reduce takeover likelihood.4 SeeGompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) for G-andBebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) for E-Index details.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%