Did the Transformation to Post-Communism in Eastern Europe Restore Pre-Communist Property Relations?

Hanley, Eric; Treiman, D. Donald J.

doi:10.1093/esr/jch024

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Red households had the highest incomes of any group in 1996, and Working Class households by far the lowest incomes. The significantly higher incomes of Middle and Bad Class households suggests the persistence of family socialization across generations, and echoes findings from Eastern Europe (Szelenyi 1988;Hanley and Treiman 2004). Red class individuals were much more likely to serve in the military, and Bad class individuals much less likely.…”

Section: Other Outcomessupporting

confidence: 66%

The Impact of Class Labels on Life Chances in China

Treiman

Walder

2019

American Journal of Sociology

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As one of its first acts in 1950, the newly established Communist government of China introduced a system of family class labels based on the relationship of the household head to the new regime and the economic position of the household in the years just before "Liberation." These labels were hereditary until their abolition three decades later. The labels were a bureaucratic mechanism to promote the advancement of households associated with support for the Communist movement before 1949, as well as households that had been economically disadvantaged, and to penalize households associated with the former Nationalist regime, along with those who prospered based on property ownership. Researchers have long suspected that these labels benefited households with connections to the Communist movement more than economically disadvantaged households, and some have seen signs that former middle and upper class households continued to do better than the economically disadvantaged despite the discrimination enforced by these labels. The impact of these labels during the 30 years they were in effect has yet to be firmly established, and their lingering impact in subsequent decades is largely unexplored. We examine the factors affecting the initial assignment of class labels and their subsequent consequences for Communist Party membership and educational and occupational attainment. Using data from a 1996 national probability survey of China, we find that the class labels had a major impact on the life chances of individuals that persisted at least into the mid-1990s, although not always in the ways that were intended.

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Section: Other Outcomessupporting

confidence: 66%

The Impact of Class Labels on Life Chances in China

Treiman

Walder

2019

American Journal of Sociology

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“…In both dimensions East Germany represented the least collectivized end of the spectrum, while Bulgaria was the opposite, and Hungary was around the median (exactly the median with 97% rate of industrial collectivization, and close to the median of 88% with its own 82% in terms of trade collectivization). Nationalization of private property (land, real estate, businesses, assets) thus took place everywhere with some local differences; Hungarians were more likely to keep their residential real estate, while agricultural collectivization was much less intense in Poland (Hanley and Treiman 2004).…”

Section: Historical Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Mobility and Political Regimes: Intergenerational Mobility in Hungary, 1949–2017

et al. 2021

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This paper measures social mobility rates in Hungary during the period 1949 to 2017, using surnames to measure social status. In those years, there were two very different social regimes. The first was the Hungarian People’s Republic (1949–1989), which was a communist regime with an avowed aim of favouring the working class. The second is the modern liberal democracy (1989–2017), which is a free-market economy. We find five surprising things. First, social mobility rates were low for both upper- and lower-class families during 1949–2017, with an underlying intergenerational status correlation of 0.6–0.8. Second, social mobility rates under communism were the same as in the subsequent capitalist regime. Third, the Romani minority throughout both periods showed even lower social mobility rates. Fourth, the descendants of the eighteenth-century noble class in Hungary were still significantly privileged in 1949 and later. And fifth, although social mobility rates did not change measurably during the transition, the composition of the political elite changed rapidly and sharply.

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“…The former constitution was a transitory patchwork, which served satisfactory but was very far from perfect. At least three basic issues 8 of the political transition remained unsolved which fuelled not only criticism but conspiracy-theories as well: (1) the transition left the former leaders of the Communist regime basically untouched, and they were not made responsible for the injustices that occurred; (2) the files and documents regarding the agents and collaborators of the former communist secret police were not made public, and the wider public still has no reliable information in this regard, which not only fuels rumours, but also legitimate worries of extortion; (3) restoration of property ownership confiscated during communism was at least very meagre (Hanley and Treiman 2004). However, this is not the place to deal with these topics, and especially to answer the question as to whether a property restoration was viable.…”

Section: Misperception One: Birth Of Illiberalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Talking Past Each Other: On Common Misperceptions in the Rule of Law Debate

Vincze

2020

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

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This chapter deals with shortcomings of the EU policies vis-à-vis Hungary and partially also Poland. Firstly, it depicts the argument that the EU’s diagnosis of illiberal backsliding is too narrow. When assessing the quality of democracy in Hungary and Poland, the Commission and the European Parliament almost exclusively focus on recent constitutional changes, and thereby overlook many other deficits which lead to a distorted picture. Secondly, there is a legitimate debate on the meaning of the basic values of the EU. Article 2 TEU contains many open-textured expressions, which might be understood differently. Thirdly, due to the incomplete diagnosis, the instruments currently being used to combat backsliding tendencies seem ill-suited on the one hand, and, on the other, the EU surprisingly does not seem to make best use of currently available tools. The chapter concludes by highlighting and discussing possible improvements of EU strategies towards backsliding states.

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Did the Transformation to Post-Communism in Eastern Europe Restore Pre-Communist Property Relations?

Abstract: D Di id d tth he e T Tr ra an ns sf fo or rm ma at ti io on n t to o P Po os st t--C Co om mm mu un ni is sm m i in n E Ea as st te er rn n E Eu ur ro op pe e R Re es st to or re e P Pr re e--C Co om mm mu un ni is st t P Pr ro op pe er rt ty y R Re el la at ti io on ns s? ?* *

Cited by 16 publications

References 37 publications

The Impact of Class Labels on Life Chances in China

The Impact of Class Labels on Life Chances in China

Social Mobility and Political Regimes: Intergenerational Mobility in Hungary, 1949–2017

Talking Past Each Other: On Common Misperceptions in the Rule of Law Debate

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