Die Österreichische Demokratie Im Vergleich 2012
DOI: 10.5771/9783845239163-193
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Die Entwicklung des Parteienwettbewerbs in Österreich im internationalen Vergleich

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
4
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5
2

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Oesch, 2012), we believe that our findings are generalizable to some extent. This holds true for the entire profile of linkage building, including phenomena such as strategic and protest voting as elements of programmatic competition, and various domains of expressive forms of voter reasoning (Wineroither & Kitschelt, 2017). Eventually, the ongoing pluralization of national party systems will provide incentives to parties of the same family to engage in strategies of 'marching separately' before elections and 'striking together' following elections.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Oesch, 2012), we believe that our findings are generalizable to some extent. This holds true for the entire profile of linkage building, including phenomena such as strategic and protest voting as elements of programmatic competition, and various domains of expressive forms of voter reasoning (Wineroither & Kitschelt, 2017). Eventually, the ongoing pluralization of national party systems will provide incentives to parties of the same family to engage in strategies of 'marching separately' before elections and 'striking together' following elections.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both the 'Balkan route closure' narrative and his spectacular rise to party leadership, in conjunction with party reform, helped him effectively deal with the simultaneous tasks of (a) avoiding blame for unpopular decision made by previous cabinets (Kurz had been a member of the cabinet since 2013) and (b) claiming credit for his record as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his role in the breakup of the grand coalition. In terms of blame avoidance, Kurz employed a strategy like that of Chancellor Schüssel, who had also formed a coalition with the FPÖ in the year 2000: he attempted to place the blame for past government performance on the Social Democrats, he enacted a cooperative leadership within his coalition, a balanced budget and, in the case of Kurz, he expressed strong anti-migrant rhetoric and enacted restrictive migration policies (for Schüssel, see Wineroither, 2009).…”
Section: Mainstream-conservative öVp Going Populistmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a two‐dimensional typology of positions of political parties, we may distinguish between economic and socio‐cultural lines of conflict: The economic dimension basically refers to the question to which extent the state should intervene in the economy, while the socio‐cultural dimension covers attitudes towards democratic freedoms and rights (Wineroither and Kitschelt, ; Bonjour, ; Bakker et al., ). Figure illustrates the positions of Austrian political parties along these cleavages.…”
Section: State Of the Artmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Parties which are open to immigration and diversity and favour a redistributive state can be expected to oppose economic criteria for naturalization, because such criteria represent an ethnicized version of classed citizenship, undermining a Marshallian ideal of equal citizenship (Marshall, ; Janoski, ). In the case of Austria, such positions – labelled equal rights in Figure – can be expected from the Green Party (Grüne) and the Social‐democratic Party (SPÖ), which take left‐wing stances on economic issues and liberal stances on issues of diversity (Wineroither and Kitschelt, ; Bakker et al., ). Parties which favour a redistributive state, but oppose immigration and diversity, may favour economic redistribution only among citizens, but object to redistribution to the benefit of foreign residents. Such a position is commonly labelled as welfare chauvinism (Bale, ), which has a clear implication for stances on economic criteria for naturalization: In order to avoid an extension of welfare benefits towards foreign residents, access to welfare benefits must be conditional upon citizenship and citizenship must be conditional upon economic self‐sufficiency.…”
Section: State Of the Artmentioning
confidence: 99%