Purpose
– The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the extent and the consequences of the provision of non-audit services (NAS) by statutory auditors to German family firms.
Design/methodology/approach
– The study analyzes hand collected fee data of 368 listed and private family firms in Germany. It employs univariate tests, ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions to investigate potential threats to perceived auditor independence and knowledge spillovers between jointly provided NAS and audit services.
Findings
– Incumbent auditors are shown to be a significant source of various types of NAS to family firms. There is weak evidence on threats to perceived auditor independence and support for reciprocal knowledge spillovers between the services. While listed and private family firms do not differ in regard to the proportion of NAS fees, comparative findings suggest that key threats and benefits of jointly provided services are more prevalent among private than among listed family firms.
Research limitations/implications
– The study suffers from limited data availability and is restricted to the initial year of mandatory audit fee disclosure of private firms in Germany. Particularities of family firms and the German setting, as well as differential results for listed and private family firms, suggest fruitful avenues for future research.
Practical implications
– The study addresses the current issues in audit regulation. Regulatory bodies should consider that key threats and benefits of auditor-provided NAS decrease with stronger exogenous restrictions. Attempts to restrict jointly provided services in the EU suggest family firms to reconsider their reliance on auditors as a trusted source of NAS.
Originality/value
– This study is the first to provide evidence on the extent and consequences of auditor-provided NAS in family firms based on fee disclosure. It is also among the few studies that investigate private firms in a code law country and complements prior evidence from Germany that is restricted to listed firms. More generally, it contributes to limited evidence at the intersection of audit and family business research.