Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

Abstract

In this paper we develop a di¤erentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is e¢ cient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality.Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D61, D78, H41.We are very grateful to

Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

“…Barberà and Moreno (2011) develop the concept of 'top monotonicity' as a common generalization of single-peakedness and single-crossingness. Corchón and Rueda-Llano (2008) analyze a public-good-private-good production economy where agents' preferences satisfy the single-crossing property. They show the non-existence of smooth strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient SCFs that give strictly positive amount of both goods to the agents.…”