2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33383-5_2
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Differential Attacks on Reduced RIPEMD-160

Abstract: In this work, we provide the first security analysis of reduced RIPEMD-160 regarding its collision resistance with practical complexity. The ISO/IEC standard RIPEMD-160 was proposed 15 years ago and may be used as a drop-in replacement for SHA-1 due to their same hash output length. Only few results have been published for RIPEMD-160 so far and most attacks have a complexity very close to the generic bound. In this paper, we present the first application of the attacks of Wang et al. on MD5 and SHA-1 to RIPEMD… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…First the number of attacked steps is increased from 36 to 42, and secondly, for the same number of attacked steps, we propose an attack that starts from the first step. Moreover, our semi-free-start collision attacks give a positive answer to the open problem raised in [10], in which the authors were not able to find any non-linear differential path in the first step, due to the XOR function that makes the non-linear part search much harder. Our 42-step semi-free-start attack is obtained from a 48-step differential path.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 92%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…First the number of attacked steps is increased from 36 to 42, and secondly, for the same number of attacked steps, we propose an attack that starts from the first step. Moreover, our semi-free-start collision attacks give a positive answer to the open problem raised in [10], in which the authors were not able to find any non-linear differential path in the first step, due to the XOR function that makes the non-linear part search much harder. Our 42-step semi-free-start attack is obtained from a 48-step differential path.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…To efficiently find non-linear differential paths and message pairs for a larger number of steps than in previous attacks [10], we had to improve the search in several ways. Especially finding a non-linear path for the XOR-round of RIPEMD-160 was quite challenging.…”
Section: Improvements For Ripemd-160mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…These approaches have then been refined in a number of publications. Recently, more sophisticated approaches have been proposed that enable attacks on more complex hash functions such as SHA-256 [27,29] among many others [20,22,26,28]. All these approaches (including the search by hand) follow the guess-and-determine strategy.…”
Section: The Search For Differential Characteristicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Then, following the extensive work on preimage attacks for MD-SHA family, [21,19,25] describe high complexity preimage attacks on up to 36 steps of RIPEMD-128 and 31 steps of RIPEMD-160. Collision attacks were considered in [16] for RIPEMD-128 and in [15] for RIPEMD-160, with 48 and 36 steps broken respectively. Finally, distinguishers based on non-random properties such as second-order collisions are given in [16,22,15], reaching about 50 steps with a very high complexity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%