Differential Fault Attack on Espresso

Bathe, Bhagwan; Tiwari, Siddhartha; Anand, Ravi; Roy, Dibyendu; Maitra, Subhamoy

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92518-5_13

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In fact, when the famous Rijndael was selected as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), there was also a need for lightweight ciphers for specific applications (Zhang et al 2019). Since then, many lightweight cryptographic algorithms, such as LBlock (Wang et al 2019), PRESENT (Cnudde and Nikova 2017), GIFT (Xie et al 2021), Espresso (Bathe et al 2021), KLEIN (Xiao and Wang 2022), et al, were successively proposed. Inspired by these block ciphers, many researchers intend to design new and more efficient schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The differential fault analysis on block cipher FeW

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Feather weight (FeW) cipher is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Kumar et al. in 2019, which takes 64 bits plaintext as input and produces 64 bits ciphertext. As Kumar et al. said, FeW is a software oriented design with the aim of achieving high efficiency in software based environments. It seems that FeW is immune to many cryptographic attacks, like linear, impossible differential, differential and zero correlation attacks. However, in recent work, Xie et al. reassessed the security of FeW. More precisely, they proved that under the differential fault analysis (DFA) on the encryption states, an attacker can completely recover the master secret key. In this paper, we revisit the block cipher FeW and consider the DFA on its key schedule algorithm, which is rather popular cryptanalysis for kinds of block ciphers. In particular, by respectively injected faults into the 30th and 29th round subkeys, one can recover about 55/80 ≈ 69% bits of master key. Then the brute force searching remaining bits, one can obtain the full master secret key. The simulations and experiment results show that our analysis is practical.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The differential fault analysis on block cipher FeW

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

An Improved Differential Fault Attack on the Stream Cipher Espresso

Das,

Ghatak,

Gupta

et al. 2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Differential Fault Attacks on Privacy Protocols Friendly Symmetric-Key Primitives: RAIN and HERA

Jiao,

Li,

Hao

et al. 2024

IET Information Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As the practical applications of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), secure multi-party computation (MPC) and zero-knowledge (ZK) proof continue to increase, so does the need to design and analyze new symmetric-key primitives that can adapt to these privacy-preserving protocols. These designs typically have low multiplicative complexity and depth with the parameter domain adapted to their application protocols, aiming to minimize the cost associated with the number of nonlinear operations or the multiplicative depth of their representation as circuits. In this paper, we propose two differential fault attacks against a one-way function RAIN used for Rainier (CCS 2022), a signature scheme based on the MPC-in-the-head approach and an FHE-friendly cipher HERA used for the RtF framework (Eurocrypt 2022), respectively. We show that our attacks can recover the keys for both ciphers by only injecting a fault into the internal state and requiring only one normal and one faulty ciphertext blocks. Thus, we can use only the practical complexity of 226.6/228.8/230.4 bit operations to break the full-round RAIN with 128/192/256-bit keys. For full-round HERA with 80/128-bit key, our attack is practical with complexity the complexity of 220 encryptions with about 216 memory.

show abstract

Differential Fault Attack on Espresso

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

The differential fault analysis on block cipher FeW

The differential fault analysis on block cipher FeW

An Improved Differential Fault Attack on the Stream Cipher Espresso

Differential Fault Attacks on Privacy Protocols Friendly Symmetric-Key Primitives: RAIN and HERA

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About