Others' observed actions cause continuously changing retinal images, making it challenging to build neural representations of action identity. The monkey anterior intraparietal area (AIP) and its putative human homologue (phAIP) host neurons selective for observed manipulative actions (OMAs). The neuronal activity of both AIP and phAIP allows a stable readout of OMA identity across visual formats, but human neurons exhibit greater invariance and generalize from observed actions to action verbs. These properties stem from the convergence in AIP of superior temporal signals concerning: (i) observed body movements; and (ii) the changes in the body-object relationship. We propose that evolutionarily preserved mechanisms underlie the specification of observed-actions identity and the selection of motor responses afforded by them, thereby promoting social behavior.
Combining Observed Body Movements and Objects Changes: The Action's IdentityManual skills are a hallmark of primates, particularly humans. They have made possible most of our transformational impact on the world, which was driven by an evolutionarily preserved but expanding network of cortical areas in the primate lineage that subserves the neural control of manipulative actions [1][2][3][4]. Interestingly, an equally well-articulated neural machinery is required to resolve the visual complexity of observed manipulative actions (OMAs) (see Glossary) performed by other individuals, because this ability is of critical importance for action planning during social interaction and interindividual coordination [5][6][7]. Indeed, as compared with other complex static visual stimuli, such as objects [8], faces [9,10], others' gaze direction [11], and body posture [12], observed actions of others are inherently dynamic stimuli, and their dynamics are essential for an observer's brain to compute their identity, despite the rapid changes in their retinal image. This is probably the reason why James Gibson claimed that 'animals are by far the most complex objects of perception that the environment presents to an observer' [13].