Differential Security Game in Heterogeneous Device-to-Device Offloading Network Under Epidemic Risks

Zhang, Letian; Xu, Jie

doi:10.1109/tnse.2019.2955036

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Decision making consists of the choices of individuals and the strategies of stakeholders at different hierarchical levels. Decision models considered in the existing literature mainly consider two types of decision-makers: a central planner [12,13,25,27,28,54,57,66,73,75,81,82,87,97,98,103,107,108,112,122,136,[139][140][141][142]144,146,148], which works for social benefits by conducting mechanism design and/or applying enforceable measures directly to the general public, and a collection of individuals with various types Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of the human-in-the-loop epidemic framework consisting of epidemic processes and decision models Fig.…”

Section: What Interventions To Take?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A central planner cares about the welfare of the whole population such as the number of infected individuals in the entire population, the well-being of the economy [12,13,25,27,28,54,57,66,73,75,81,82,87,97,98,103,107,108,112,122,136,[139][140][141][142]144,146,148]. Individuals concern about their own interests, which include his/her own infection risk, the inconvenience of wearing a mask, and the monetary cost of getting an effective treatment [2,13,16,21,27,30,35,36,50,56,59,65,66,114,127,129,130,145].…”

Section: Who Are the Decision-makers?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Game theory, in a nutshell, is a powerful mathematical tool of modeling how people make strategic decisions within a group [15,38]. In the last decade, there has been a surge in research studies in game-theoretic decision-making amid an epidemic [2,10,13,16,18,21,23,27,30,31,34,50,[55][56][57]59,[65][66][67]73,78,82,84,99,107,114,115,120,122,127,129,130,141,145,146]. The reason behind the surge is three-fold.…”

Section: Game-theoretic Decision-making In Epidemicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, some papers introduce the role of central authorities and study how central authorities should create incentives/penalties to achieve social optimum [13,34,107]. Another strain of research focuses on the interplay between a central authority and an adversary [73,122,141,146]. The adversary aims to maximize the overall damage inflicted by the malware and the central authority tries to find the best counter-measure policy to oppose the spread of the infection.…”

Section: A Multi-dimensional Taxonomy Of Game-theoretic Models In Epi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

Huang

Zhu

2022

Dyn Games Appl

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This review presents and reviews various solved and open problems in developing, analyzing, and mitigating epidemic spreading processes under human decision-making. We provide a review of a range of epidemic models and explain the pros and cons of different epidemic models. We exhibit the art of coupling between epidemic models and decision models in the existing literature. More specifically, we provide answers to fundamental questions in human decision-making amid epidemics, including what interventions to take to combat the disease, who are decision-makers, and when and how to take interventions, and how to make interventions. Among many decision models, game-theoretic models have become increasingly crucial in modeling human responses or behavior amid epidemics in the last decade. In this review, we motivate the game-theoretic approach to human decision-making amid epidemics. This review provides an overview of the existing literature by developing a multi-dimensional taxonomy, which categorizes existing literature based on multiple dimensions, including (1) types of games, such as differential games, stochastic games, evolutionary games, and static games; (2) types of interventions, such as social distancing, vaccination, quarantine, and taking antidotes; (3) the types of decision-makers, such as individuals, adversaries, and central authorities at different hierarchical levels. A fine-grained dynamic game framework is proposed to capture the essence of game-theoretic decision-making amid epidemics. We showcase three representative frameworks with unique ways of integrating game-theoretic decision-making into the epidemic models from a vast body of literature. Each of the three frameworks has their unique way of modeling and analyzing and develops results from different angles. In the end, we identify several main open problems and research gaps left to be addressed and filled. KeywordsDynamic games • Stochastic games • Infectious diseases • Epidemic spreading • Human-in-the-loop systems • COVID-19 This article is part of the topical collection "Modeling and Control of Epidemics" edited by Quanyan Zhu,

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Section: What Interventions To Take?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Who Are the Decision-makers?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Game-theoretic Decision-making In Epidemicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Multi-dimensional Taxonomy Of Game-theoretic Models In Epi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

Huang

Zhu

2022

Dyn Games Appl

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“…Acarali et al [33] built a botnet propagation model called IoT-SIS for WSNs-based IoT networks, which reflects IoT-specific characteristics. Zhang and Xu [34] set up an SICD (Susceptible-Infectious-Cured-Dead) model with two particular non-cooperative states, which characterizes the D2D malware propagation process. Xia et al [35] proposed an IDEPSR model for analyzing malware propagation in city IoT, which reflects social features including the propagation and identification abilities of smart devices.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

SIR₁R₂: Characterizing Malware Propagation in WSNs With Second Immunization

2021

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As an infrastructure of Internet of Things, WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks) play a more and more important role. However, WSNs are vulnerable to malware and malware can destroy their data security and integrity, which motivates us to explore the role of malware propagation in WSNs. First, according to the actual propagation characteristics of malware in the WSNs and the process of the density change of all node types, we propose an epidemiology-based malware propagation model in consideration of a secondary immune mechanism. Then we set up differential equations to describe the propagation model. By solving differential equations, we can obtain two kinds of equilibrium points indicating that the density of all node types tends to be stable in the WSNs. One is to achieve an equilibrium where only susceptible nodes exist in the WSNs. The other is that malware always exists in the WSNs. Moreover, we prove the local and global stability of these two equilibrium points. Eventually, we analyze the influence and effect of the secondary immunity, forgetting mechanism and containment mechanism on malware propagation in the WSNs, and validate the proposed model through simulations.

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Differential game-based analysis of multi-attacker multi-defender interaction

Gao

Zhang

et al. 2021

Sci. China Inf. Sci.

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Differential Security Game in Heterogeneous Device-to-Device Offloading Network Under Epidemic Risks

Cited by 22 publications

References 28 publications

Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

SIR₁R₂: Characterizing Malware Propagation in WSNs With Second Immunization

Differential game-based analysis of multi-attacker multi-defender interaction

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Differential Security Game in Heterogeneous Device-to-Device Offloading Network Under Epidemic Risks

Cited by 22 publications

References 28 publications

Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review

SIR1R2: Characterizing Malware Propagation in WSNs With Second Immunization

Differential game-based analysis of multi-attacker multi-defender interaction

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SIR₁R₂: Characterizing Malware Propagation in WSNs With Second Immunization