Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Liu, Haolin; Lian, Xinyuan; Zhao, Dengji

doi:10.48550/arxiv.2201.08616

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Benchmark. The only currently known IC multi-unit diffusion auction mechanism, LDM-Tree [13], is chosen as our benchmark. Random selection is used as a benchmark for traversal strategies.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We call this idea competition localisation. The LDM-Tree mechanism [13] applies a form of competition localisation. Specifically, it localise competition within each layer of the diffusion critical tree, where layer L i contains agents whose distance from the seller is i.…”

Section: Diffusion Auction By Graph Explorationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This mechanism, however, relies on the buyers' budgets which is not available in the standard multi-unit diffusion auction. Then, the LDM-Tree mechanism [13] applies a layerbased iterative allocation process, where buyers in the same layer have equal distance to the seller. Essentially, the LDM-Tree alleviates competition by restricting information diffusion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Fang,

Zhang,

Liu

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion auctions. Despite numerous attempts at this problem, existing mechanisms either fail to be incentive compatible (IC) or achieve only an unsatisfactory level of social welfare (SW). Here, we propose a novel graph exploration technique to realise multi-item diffusion auction. This technique ensures that potential competition among buyers stay “localised” so as to facilitate truthful bidding. Using this technique, we design multi-unit diffusion auction mechanisms MUDAN and MUDAN-m. Both mechanisms satisfy, among other properties, IC and 1/m-weak efficiency. We also show that they achieve optimal social welfare for the class of rewardless diffusion auctions. While MUDAN addresses the bottleneck case when each buyer demands only a single item, MUDAN-m handles the more general, multi-demand setting. We further demonstrate that these mechanisms achieve near-optimal social welfare through experiments.

show abstract

“…Benchmark. The only currently known IC multi-unit diffusion auction mechanism, LDM-Tree [13], is chosen as our benchmark. Random selection is used as a benchmark for traversal strategies.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Diffusion Auction By Graph Explorationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Fang,

Zhang,

Liu

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In that case, those buyers who are removed when computing lower layers' allocations have no incentives to affect the allocations to lower layers. The detailed analysis of such observation and the whole proof for IC are given in the full version of this paper [14].…”

Section: Theorem 1 the Ldm-tree Is Individually Rational (Ir)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Theorem 3, we show the revenue improvements of LDM-Tree. The detailed proofs can also be found in the full version [14].…”

Section: Proposition 2 Ldm-tree Is Non-wastefulmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diffusion Multi-Unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Liu,

Lian,

Zhao

2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items. The seller initially only connects to some buyers who can be directly invited to the sale by the seller. Our goal is to design an auction to incentivize the buyers who are aware of the auction to further invite their neighbors to join the auction. This is challenging because the buyers are competing for the items and they would not invite each other by default. Thus, rewards need to be given to buyers who invite their neighbors, but the rewards should be carefully designed to guarantee both invitation incentives and the seller’s revenue. Solutions have been proposed recently for the settings where each buyer requires at most one unit but they are proved problematic. We move this forward to propose the very first diffusion auction for the multi-unit demand settings to improve both the social welfare and the seller’s revenue.

show abstract

Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Diffusion Multi-Unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About