Digital Sensor Technology

Quinn, Ted; Mauck, Jerry; Bockhorst, R.M.; Thomas, Ken

doi:10.2172/1110331

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Annex C of IEC 61508-6 [16] provides an example of calculating diagnostic coverage and should be read in conjunction with Annex C of IEC 61508-2 [17]. Technically, IEC-61508 addresses only hardware failures; the issue of performing similar analyses for software failure rates and systematics appears to still be an open question (Quinn et al [18] and IEEE Std 1633 [19] review potential software reliability assessment methods).…”

Section: Change-in-risk and Diagnostic Coverage From Self-diagnosticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

Muhlheim,

Coles,

Ramuhalli

et al. 2023

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Section: Change-in-risk and Diagnostic Coverage From Self-diagnosticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A key consideration in the crediting of monitoring is the treatment of what are termed dangerous detected and dangerous undetected failure fractions, which are established to provide input to the reliability model for the device and the associated system [18].…”

Section: Summary and Future Plansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

Muhlheim,

Coles,

Ramuhalli

et al. 2023

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“…If redundant or even different channels use devices of the same manufacturer make and model number, as is typically the case, there would be no diversity in this set of instruments relative to CCF susceptibility and it is conceivable that a digital defect would simultaneously affect all channels and cause the design function to fail, in spite of the redundancy. For highly safety-significant instrumentation, the results of the regulatory-required diversity analysis could be to require an instrument signal diverse from these instruments to cope with a CCF as described in a DOE research report entitled Digital Sensor Technology [47].…”

Section: Testabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy for Safety-Related Digital I&C Qualification

Thomas

Scarola²

2018

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Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) qualification continues to be a major impediment to addressing the reliability and obsolescence issues of the legacy analog I&C systems of the operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. In particular, the issue of digital common cause failure (CCF) has been difficult to address and has been the reason some nuclear plant operators have deferred upgrades of these critical plant systems, opting rather to maintain them with costly engineering and maintenance efforts. This has now become far more difficult in the face of declining analog technology suppliers and dwindling availability of spare parts and technical support for critical plant components. At the same time, the nuclear fleet must now reduce its operating costs to remain competitive in a market of low cost gas generation and heavily-subsidized renewables. Digital technology's inherent capabilities of integration, interconnectivity, and standardization offer the foremost means of implementing performance improvements and cost reductions for this purpose. This has been demonstrated over and over again in other industry sectors, as well as in conventional electric generation facilities. However, these digital technologies present certain I&C qualification barriers that must be addressed to enable full deployment where cost-beneficial. This report presents an assessment of digital I&C qualification issues and addresses gaps in qualification methods and processes that would potentially benefit from Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored research and development. Two new qualification methods are described that are recommended for further investigation. They are 1) Testability-the exhaustive (100%) testing of certain digital devices accounting for all combinations of inputs and internal states to ensure there are no digital defects, and 2) Elimination of CCF triggers-ensuring that any latent digital defects are not concurrently triggered in multiple digital functions that are assumed to be independent (e.g., redundant safety systems).

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Digital Sensor Technology

Cited by 2 publications

References 3 publications

Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

Strategy for Safety-Related Digital I&C Qualification

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