Diluted regulations—a need to review the theoretical classification of the different lobbying regulatory environments

Abstract

Regulation has been claimed to be acquired by the industry, yet while the economic regulation was often established with the approval and encouragement of the regulated industry, social regulation has usually been thrust upon industry following demands by public interest groups. Why would the social regulation still fail to produce behaviour, or results in accordance with the public interest, if the public interest groups initiated it? The failure to define clearly the concept of 'public interest' and the absence of adequately clear regulatory objectives would not provide all the convincing answers. The wish of the politicians to respond to a mischief before public concern dies down, seems to point towards the symbolic politics claims.Although lobbying is integral to democratic politics, it challenges the policy making process as the risks and opportunities associated with policy change are large. Lobbying regulations, belonging to the social regulations fold, have been observed as symbolic in Israel and are diluted by tricky loopholes. Recent research has used data from Centre of Public Integrity (CPI) in order to theoretically classify different regulatory environments. The CPI measures only what the law says, but it does not measure the outcome-the application of the law. This paper points out that the possible interaction of symbolic politics with social regulation may lead to the reoccurring legislative void, resulting in the dilution effect of the lobbying regulations, and it highlights the need to review the theoretical classification, and thereby, also the actual strength of the different regulatory environments.

Lobbying in the sunshine—hiding behind transparency?

“…(: 4) suggest include the following: (1) registering with the state before contact can be made with any public official, clearly indicating which ministry/public actors the lobbyist intends to influence; (2) providing the state with individual‐spending or employer‐spending disclosures; (3) having a publicly available list with lobbyists details available for citizens to scrutinize; and (4) ensuring that former legislators cannot immediately jump into the world of lobbying once they have left public office. The theoretical justification for having this information is based on ensuring transparency and accountability in the political system (Veksler, : 2).…”

Politicized CSR: How corporate political activity (mis‐)uses political CSR

“…From a public policy perspective, access to legislators can be controlled by lobbying registers, political donations can be limited, or job changes from politics to business can be embargoed (Veksler, ). However, such regulation may not always have the intended benefit if not controlled and sanctioned.…”

Assessing the validity and reliability of measurements when evaluating public policy

“…Moreover, two years later, Holman and Luneburg (2012) produced modifications to the conceptual dimensions of robustness, where subsequent scholars more explicitly developed an empirical index on the basis of their work (Crepaz 2016a). These pieces have subsequently sparked debate, from criticisms that some of the indices do not capture robustness effectively (Veksler 2015), to those that have examined the impact of lobbying regulation on lobbying styles (Woll 2012).…”

“…2See for example, Opheim (1991), Lowery and Gray (1997), Greenwood and Thomas (1998), Greenwood (1998), Thomas (1998), Yishai (1998), Rechtman and Larsen-Ledet (1998), Jordan (1998), Newmark (2005), Ozymy (2010, 2013), Chari et al (2010), Holman and Luneburg (2012), Greenwood and Dreger (2013), Holyoke (2015), Veksler (2015). …”