Dimensions of animal wellbeing

Abstract

Whether animals fare well or not is of ethical significance. For this reason, their capacity for wellbeing, i.e., how good or bad the lives of animals can go, is of ethical significance as well. I assume that the wellbeing of most animals is mainly determined by their phenomenally conscious experiences. If consciousness differences between species determine wellbeing differences, then the kinds of conscious experience species are capable of may entail that some species systematically (can) have higher or lower wellbeing than others. Then, I argue that not all phenomenally conscious states contribute to wellbeing equally. I discuss which features of consciousness are constituents of wellbeing and which can, for ethical purposes, be ignored. In addition, I scrutinize how much different features of experience contribute to wellbeing and how their presence can be detected empirically. This way, this paper exemplifies a novel consciousness-centered approach for the empirical investigation of animal wellbeing. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are analyzed. While subsequent research is needed to refine the framework, I already note some preliminary implications for animal ethics.

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework

“…Furthermore, if we hold that a specific kind of sentience profile has consequences for what the optimal approach to an animal’s welfare is, then we need to track the changes in its profile, in order to adapt our welfare measures. For example, Dung (2023) claims that some dimensions of the sentience model are of greater importance to animal welfare than others, such as E-richness and Temporality. If this is the case, it becomes paramount for research into animal welfare to discover when such dimensions come online or are expressed to their highest degree.…”