Directly Elected Mayors and their Parties: The Cases of Genoa and Lausanne

Abstract

While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect parties. This article addresses these questions using a qualitative case study of the relationship between mayors and the three faces of their parties (in local public office, local central office and on the ground) in Genoa and Lausanne. Based on interviews with the mayors, elected representatives and party members, it finds in the two cases that, as long as these mayors can count on high levels of popularity and are not nearing the end of their term, they are 'party detached'. When these factors do not apply and/or party institutionalization increases, the relationship with the party in local central office (although not with the party in local public office or on the ground) becomes more significant.

Towards a Populist Local Democracy? The Consequences of Populist Radical Right Local Government Leadership in Western Europe

“…While the council representatives remain 'responsive' to migration issues and follow the ethnocentric party line, the local executive performs a 'responsible' administrative role and employ more pluralist framing of citizenship. Such a defence of executive decisions and programmes in opposition to their own representatives has previously been observed from other Swiss local government actors (Mcdonnell & Mazzoleni, 2014). This hybrid 'one foot in, one foot out of government' strategy has also been observed with PRR parties in national government (Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2005;Bernhard et al, 2015;Zaslove, 2012).…”

Determinants of Government Membership at the Subnational Level: Empirical Evidence from Large Cities in Germany (1999–2016)

“…For example, the empirical findings indicate the need to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the head of the executive and her party (see e.g. McDonnell and Mazzoleni 2014). One important assumption made in the literature on government formations is that the head of the executive adopts the same policy position as her party (see Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Martínez-Gallardo 2014).…”

With a Little Help from Their Friends: The Consequences of Populists in National Government for Policymaking in Local Government

“…Yet much work remains to be done on how parties – populist parties in particular – interact with mayors (Castelli Gattinara 2020: 7). Reflecting on this lacuna, Duncan McDonnell and Oscar Mazzoleni (2014: 115–116) call for more research ‘conducted in cities with different structural opportunities and different institutional, personal and partisan factors – [which] could help to shed further light on the so-far opaque relationships between directly elected mayors and their parties’. With the party in national government, the central party may seek to use these local positions to expand its policy influence.…”