“…Therefore, in China, boards with higher centrality are more likely to use their network directly or indirectly to connect with political authority, intervening in news reports, social media and other public opinion systems, thereby weakening the exposure risks of symbolic management. Similar logic has also been found in other corporate practices; for example, firms with higher board centrality implement more inefficient mergers and acquisitions ( Tao et al, 2019 ) and higher earnings management ( Abdul Wahab et al, 2020 ), because they are more likely to circumvent the influence of public opinion supervision. Second, boards with higher centrality help to reduce information asymmetry among them and their connecting firm, making it easier for their firms to obtain and utilize information ( Larcker et al, 2013 ), namely, allowing them to effectively observe and learn the successful experience of symbolic practices from other peers and then use them in their own firms ( Nandy et al, 2020 ).…”