2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-646x.2004.00109.x
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Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Abstract: Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the ext… Show more

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Cited by 141 publications
(112 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…This finding supports the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that directors ownership helps to match the interests between directors and shareholders. The finding also illustrates that institutional ownership significantly influences the extent of CSR reporting, which reinforces the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004). Through their power, institutional owners are able to influence management on CSR practices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).…”
Section: Regression Analysissupporting
confidence: 78%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…This finding supports the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that directors ownership helps to match the interests between directors and shareholders. The finding also illustrates that institutional ownership significantly influences the extent of CSR reporting, which reinforces the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004). Through their power, institutional owners are able to influence management on CSR practices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).…”
Section: Regression Analysissupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Directors' ownership enhances CSR reporting, with similar findings reported by Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004). This finding supports the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that directors ownership helps to match the interests between directors and shareholders.…”
Section: Regression Analysissupporting
confidence: 75%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that monitoring directors who have ownership interest might not disclose more to create pressure on the management. According to prior studies, these directors may not disclose more information because they already know the inside information and might be interested to maximise their interest, hence conceal some of the material information (Ahmed, 2013;Chau & Gray, 2002;Eng & Mak, 2003;Leung & Horwitz, 2004). This result also supports Akhtaruddin et.…”
Section: Voluntary Risk Disclosuresupporting
confidence: 79%
“…Los consejeros independientes son más efectivos en la maximización del valor para los accionistas, y por tanto, pueden contribuir con un mayor conocimiento y experiencia. Bajo este enfoque, se ha asociado una relación significativa entre el nivel de divulgación de información y la proporción de consejeros independientes en diferentes contextos (Chen y Jaggi, 2000;Leung y Horwitz, 2004;Ajinkya et al, 2005;Kent y Steward, 2008). Al tenor de lo expuesto, se espera que una mayor proporción de consejeros independientes incremente el nivel de divulgación de GC en empresas cotizadas Latinoamericanas.…”
Section: El Sistema Legalunclassified