Disability Through the Lens of Justice

Abstract

When thinking about disability in the context of justice, our focus should not be on the ways in which people’s bodies and minds function differently. Instead, we should shift our focus to the limitations that this leads to—for particular people, in particular contexts. And, at least from the perspective of justice, only a subset of these limitations matter. Specifically, those that prevent individuals from having control in certain domains of their life, by restricting the availability of acceptable options or the ability to choose between them. Our theory of justice should be concerned with the lives individuals can lead, and not with whether their bodies and minds function typically. What matters is that people can be mobile, form relationships, engage in leisure, and so on—not how they achieve these things. The problem that disability raises is not the mere fact of difference, but the ways in which that difference is accommodated (or not) and the limitations it may cause. Indeed, on my definition of disability, to be disabled just is to be unable to exercise the control over our life that everyone should be able to. Our focus, then, should not be on whether someone has received a particular diagnosis, or on the most visible deviations from what we take to be the species norm, but on whether people have access to central capabilities. Achieving justice does not require ‘normalisation’, or the elimination of difference, but enabling all individuals to control their lives as they choose.

Public Justification, Evaluative Standards, and Different Perspectives in the Attribution of Disability

“…Thus, the question of selecting a social environment is fundamental, and we cannot only base the definition of deprivation on the internal dimensions of a person's capabilities. 5 We will now show the different strategies for selecting capabilities from the lists offered so far.…”

“…The thought was endorsed by Nussbaum by inserting among capabilities "Being able to use the five senses" ([67] p. 222). 8 Instead, Begon speaks about impairments in exercising control over important parts of our lives [5]. According to this definition, deafness is not necessarily a disability if the capabilities to control employment (through access to some professions), socialization (through forms of communication that do not imply hearing), enjoyment in the arts (through reading novels or watching visual artworks), etc.…”

“…In some cases, arbitrary psychiatric classifications have assumed the most brutal forms of political repression: ""Misfits" and politically unwanted citizens were regularly deemed psychiatric patients because of their deviant behavior" ( [2] p. 258). Additionally, recent contributions highlight the importance of a fair definition of values and entitlements of justice for the determination of disability [3][4][5][6][7] and the social and political components of mental disabilities [8,9]. Moreover, the political dimension is underscored by activists who reject the qualification of disability for their condition, which they instead describe as minority 1 , diverse, or atypical.…”

“…Moreover, the political dimension is underscored by activists who reject the qualification of disability for their condition, which they instead describe as minority 1 , diverse, or atypical. Such activism is not only present in disputes about mental disabilities, as in the neurodiversity movement [10] but also in debates on physical disabilities, such as the engagement for the definition of deafness as a condition of a linguistic minority rather than a disability [5,11,12].…”

“…To establish that a person has a mental disability, we need to determine that her deprivation of capabilities (for example, for working and socializing) below a certain threshold is not caused by the absence of external dimensions of capabilities at the required level (because of dysfunctional social conditions or environments) or economic deprivation. In this case, we would have an unfair attribution of disability and a dysfunctional society, as denounced by Begon [3][4][5] and Glackin [6].…”