Disaggregating public‐private governance interactions: European Union interventions in transnational private sustainability governance

Abstract

Transnational private sustainability governance, such as eco-certification, does not operate in a regulatory or jurisdictional vacuum. A public authority may intervene in private governance for various reasons, including to improve private governance's efficient functioning or to assert public regulatory primacy. This article argues that to properly understand the nature of public-private governance interactions-whether more competitive or complementary-we need to disaggregate a public authority's intervention. The article distinguishes between four features of private governance in which a public authority can intervene: standard setting, procedural aspects, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives. Using the cases of the European Union's policies on organic agriculture and biofuels production, the article shows that public-private governance interaction dynamics vary across these private governance features as well as over time. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the importance of active lobbying by private governance actors in influencing these dynamics and the resulting policy outputs.

Private authority and public policy interactions in global context: Governance spheres for problem solving

“…As others have noted, private governance often occurs “in the shadow of hierarchy” where private authorities are threatened with state intervention when they fail to achieve certain goals (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008; Steurer 2013). Renckens (2020) showed that even in instances where the European Union has “co‐opted” private governance such as in the cases of organic agriculture and biofuels production, the European Union's interventions do not in the end lead to the European Union imposing its sovereign authority in a way that undermines or threatens private governance as a regulatory institution. The European Union merely imposes minimum baselines while still deferring to private governance.…”

“…Such dynamics may reflect, for example: changing legitimation imperatives, whether arising from the exigencies of globalization (Matten & Moon 2008) or a strengthening and reformulation of social expectations for business more broadly (Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Matten & Moon 2020); changing capacities of national public regulatory authorities (Locke 2013); or changing amounts of private governance in a given area, its relevance to public policy objectives, or its transparency about outcomes and impacts (Gulbrandsen 2014). This approach is also capable of incorporating the multitude of ways in which governments can intervene to shape private regulations, including standard setting, procedures, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives (Renckens 2021).…”

How domestic contexts shape international private governance: The case of the European Accord and American Alliance in Bangladesh

“…Although firms typically prefer PG that aligns with their prevailing and familiar business systems, their geographic location is not path dependent; other important factors are also at play. This case demonstrated the power of activism in shaping companies' PG choices, just as it has on policy decision in the EU (Renckens 2021). The role of outside influence and pressure can therefore be considered an intervening variable to consider when predicting firms' choices and proclivities for particular modes of PG.…”

Transforming Markets? Activists’ Strategic Orientations and Engagement With Private Governance

“…Activists strategies adopted at one time can also alter the receptiveness of market players to further engagement by these activists, creating either positive (McDonnell et al, 2015) or negative feedbacks (Durand & Georgallis, 2018). Activists strategies and corporate responses can also lead to political and policy feedbacks, potentially by crowding out further public interventions (Werner, 2012), or by creating the impetus for such an intervention through government rules specifying the appropriate substantive requirements for private governance (e.g., organics) or the procedures for checking rule adherence (e.g., biofuels in the European Union; Renckens, 2014).…”