Disciplinary Technologies of Microfinance: Fictitious Proximity, Visibility and Surveillance in Rural Microfinance in Bangladesh

Abstract

In this paper, I delve into governmental and disciplinary technologies in microfinance practice. I aim to reveal the disciplinary and governmental powers that guarantee proper repayment of debt in state- and NGO-sponsored microfinance programmes. Using Foucault’s notion of conduct of conduct, I uncover how loan officers consistently maintain meticulous control over borrowers and assure a docility-utility relationship. Based on seven months of fieldwork on rural microfinance in the North-eastern part of Bangladesh, I reveal the strategic relationship of loan officers and borrowers, the loan officers’ techniques of recording and reporting borrowers, the methods of differentiating good and bad borrowers, the practices of putting special attention on particular borrowers, and surveillance processes over borrowers’ family and economic activities. While microfinance programmes are repeatedly hailed as an effective measure of development policy, this empirical research in Bangladesh arrives at a different result: A high extent of governing and disciplinary behaviours are present in microfinance programmes. As a result, financial success is ensured through proper debt repayments.

Microcredit and the Financial Frontiers of Racial Neoliberalism

“…The empowerment involved in such a right may be capital's "power over," rather than the creation of "power to," for use by those in poverty (Hussain 2019). Neoliberal inflections of rights, drawing on the case of microfinance, remain molded to racialized modes of differential valuation, but may work through a distorting kind of inclusion.…”

Rural–urban financial inclusion: Implications on the cost sustainability of microfinance lenders

“…On the other hand, social capital/cohesion and its concomitant group solidarity, which characterize the rural areas, promote mutual trust among rural borrowers in a group and also facilitate their proper supervision by MFIs. Besides, loan officers can easily gain access to their borrowers in the rural areas relative to the urban areas (Hussain, 2019). All these can reduce the cost of services and also enhance the financial sustainability of the financial institutions (e.g., MFIs).…”

Why Does Microfinance Target Women? Empirical Evidence from Nigeria

“…84–90). Similarly, Hussain (2019) asserts that loan officers purposefully create a situation of “shame” to promote repayment (p. 159). Targeting women through these structures suggests a potential for profit and benefits the MFIs at the expense of the women’s social capital and well-being.…”

“…Additionally, MF aims to alleviate poverty, advance gender equality, and empower women by enhancing their decision-making capacity within the family and society (Hussain et al, 2018;Zhang & Posso, 2017). Proponents of MF point to the impressive repayment rates and many female borrowers as evidence of their success (Grameen Bank, 2020;Microfinance Barometer, 2019, p. 2). For example, Grameen Bank reported a 99.6% loan repayment rate in 2017, with 97% of its 9 million borrowers being women (Grameen Bank, 2020).…”

“…Proponents of MF point to the impressive repayment rates and many female borrowers as evidence of their success (Grameen Bank, 2020;Microfinance Barometer, 2019, p. 2). For example, Grameen Bank reported a 99.6% loan repayment rate in 2017, with 97% of its 9 million borrowers being women (Grameen Bank, 2020).…”