1997
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023382
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Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings

Abstract: (ii) quelles sont les conséquences du fardeau de la preuve que la firme doit supporter ? (iii) quel est l impact de la précision de la preuve et des coûts associés à sa produciton sur la décision de l agence et le bien-être de la firme ?Mots-clés : réglementation, information imparfaite, production de preuves

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Cited by 55 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…We also differ from another well-known strand of literature in which parties cannot falsify the verifiable evidence as such but are able to misrepresent it by disclosing only what they see fit; see Sobel (1985), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Lewis andPoitevin (1997), andShin (1998). Finally, our article is related to the literature comparing adversarial with inquisitorial procedures of truth finding; see Shin (1998), Dewatripont andTirole (1999), andPalumbo (2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…We also differ from another well-known strand of literature in which parties cannot falsify the verifiable evidence as such but are able to misrepresent it by disclosing only what they see fit; see Sobel (1985), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Lewis andPoitevin (1997), andShin (1998). Finally, our article is related to the literature comparing adversarial with inquisitorial procedures of truth finding; see Shin (1998), Dewatripont andTirole (1999), andPalumbo (2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…A simple guideline here is to place the burden on the party who can supply the information at lower cost, and it may be that, in this respect, the regulatee-regulator relationship has diff erent characteristics from the criminal defendant-prosecutor relationship (Lewis and Poitevin, 1997). But there are other variables involved.…”
Section: Procedural Arrangementsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, to the extent that this paper advocates 'hard' game-theoretical foundations to appropriately incorporate institutional and legal features in contract-theoretical analysis, our work is conceptually indebted to the models of trials that appear in the law and economics literature (such as Milgrom and Roberts, 1986;Rubinfeld and Sappington, 1987;Daughety and Reinganum, 2000b), and to the explicit modeling of inalienable decisions and technological constraints in contract- 15 In the legal literature, Posner (1999) proposes both a search model and a cost-minimization model of evidence production, and compares their features both in the inquisitorial and in the adversarial system; similar in purpose is the analysis of Lewis and Poitevin (1997) who examine how different rules for presentation of evidence affect verdicts in regulatory hearings modeled as games of imperfect information.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%