2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1156407
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Disclosure Quality, Cost of Capital, and Investors' Welfare

Abstract: It is widely believed that disclosure quality improves investors' welfare by reducing cost of capital in a competitive market. This paper examines this conventional wisdom by studying a production economy in which disclosure influences a firm's investment decisions. I demonstrate three points. First, cost of capital could increase with disclosure quality when new investment is sufficiently elastic. Second, there are plausible conditions under which disclosure quality reduces the welfare of current and/or new i… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…For example, Proposition 2 inLambert et al (2007), and Theorem 1 inChristensen et al (2010) both detail an inverse link between exogenously specified disclosure quality and cost of capital measured at the date of disclosure. Similary, Proposition 3 ofEasley and O'Hara (2004) details an inverse link between an exogenously specified amount of public (versus private) information disclosed and cost of capital Gao's (2010). Proposition 1 derives a possibly non-monotonic link between disclosure quality and cost of capital by allowing endogenous production decisions by firms, but with exogenously specified disclosure quality.…”
mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…For example, Proposition 2 inLambert et al (2007), and Theorem 1 inChristensen et al (2010) both detail an inverse link between exogenously specified disclosure quality and cost of capital measured at the date of disclosure. Similary, Proposition 3 ofEasley and O'Hara (2004) details an inverse link between an exogenously specified amount of public (versus private) information disclosed and cost of capital Gao's (2010). Proposition 1 derives a possibly non-monotonic link between disclosure quality and cost of capital by allowing endogenous production decisions by firms, but with exogenously specified disclosure quality.…”
mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…However, in Section 2 I briefly discuss some prior research that is directly related to my paper. Also, I restrict my attention to a setting where there is no information asymmetry among investors (in contrast to, for example, Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Lambert et al (2012)), and no 'real effects' of disclosure, that is, a pure exchange economy (in contrast to, for example, the last section in Lambert et al (2007), Gao (2010) and Cai (2013), amongst others).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kanodia and Lee, 1998;Kanodia et al 2004;Kanodia, 2008). To date, we have very limited research which links the real effect of disclosure directly to the cost of capital, with the exception of Gao (2010), Zhang (2013) and a handful of voluntary disclosure studies (e.g. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003;Cheynel, 2013;Clinch and Verricchia, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%