Disclosure Regime and Bargaining in Vertical Markets

Petrakis, Emmanuel; Skartados, Panagiotis

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3221620

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Rey and Vergé [2020] provide micro-foundations for this solution concept in their extension to the case of interim observable contracts too. In fact, there are papers in the vertical contracting literature whose focus is whether firms prefer interim observability over interim unobservability (e.g., Arya and Mittendorf [2011], Petrakis and Skartados [2022]).…”

Section: Vii(i) Interim Observable Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*

Milliou,

Petrakis

2023

The J Industrial Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two‐part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.

show abstract

Section: Vii(i) Interim Observable Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*

Milliou,

Petrakis

2023

The J Industrial Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In our paper, the information that is shared or kept secret is not exogenous as in these two papers, but rather arises endogenously as a result of the contractual arrangements between the firms' owners and their managers (see also Arya & Mittendorf, 2011; Liu & Wang, 2014). Petrakis and Panagiotis (2018) consider a setting where suppliers and retailers bargain over the terms of their two‐part wholesale contract and contract information is revealed if in a supplier‐retailer pair both parties agree to disclose. They find that only symmetric equilibria occur with full disclosure or no disclosure.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our paper is further related to Theilen (2007), Bagnoli and Watts (2015b), Petrakis and Panagiotis (2018) and Oh and Shiiba (2020). The first two contributions study how firms' incentives for information revelation are shaped under Cournot competition when firms delegate either their output decision or their output and revelation choice to a manager.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Kopel

Putz

2021

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus on either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. We find that the Cournot firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas the Bertrand firm rewards sales. Both firms share contract information if the firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, if product differentiation is low, then either the Cournot firm or the Bertrand firm keeps the contract information private. Mandating information sharing can lead to an increase in consumer and social welfare but harms firms' profits.

show abstract