2023
DOI: 10.2308/tar-2019-0407
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Disclosure Speed: Evidence from Nonpublic SEC Investigations

Abstract: We examine cross-sectional variation in disclosure speed by using data that allow us to measure when managers learn of SEC investigations and the time lag until subsequent disclosures. We document that external monitoring and litigation risk are associated with 99% and 39% faster disclosure, and managerial entrenchment with 28% slower disclosure. When revelations by external parties preempt managers’ disclosures, we observe a significant increase in bid-ask spreads that persists for at least three years follow… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Bernile et al (2015) find that firms subjected to SEC/Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations or shareholder lawsuits have larger and more persistently negative preexposure trading imbalances. Disclosure speed may also have an impact on SEC investigations (Field et al, 2005;Blackburne and Quinn, 2020).…”
Section: Sec Investigationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bernile et al (2015) find that firms subjected to SEC/Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations or shareholder lawsuits have larger and more persistently negative preexposure trading imbalances. Disclosure speed may also have an impact on SEC investigations (Field et al, 2005;Blackburne and Quinn, 2020).…”
Section: Sec Investigationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Specifically, as key executives may update their beliefs about the likelihood that potential wrongdoing is detected, they may modify their actions once they are made aware of an SEC regulatory inquiry [3]. For example, prior literature documents that SEC investigations are associated with a substantial decline in future firm performance and severe insider trading [4], increased analyst coverage, an increased likelihood of appointing a large auditor, high litigation risk [5], decreased capital expenditures, and increased likelihoods of CEO turnover, earnings restatements, and class action lawsuits [3]. Although the SEC currently does not regulate CSR activities, failures related to the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting and performance are investigated by the SEC and/or external auditors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To our knowledge, however, prior research has paid little attention to this question. To provide systematic evidence of the direction of this effect, we follow Blackburne et al (2021a, 2021b; Blackburne and Quinn, 2023) [3][4][5] and utilize their novel dataset of all the SEC's Division of Enforcement investigations. This dataset covers investigations during the period between 2000 and 2017 and contains the opening and closing dates of the SEC investigations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Early studies infer managers' private information during the quarter based on quarter-end realizations, patterns of stock returns upon eventual disclosure, strategic timing of disclosure around other events, or other assumptions about the amount and timing of information (e.g., Skinner 1994;Kasznik and Lev 1995;Aboody and Kasznik 2000;Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009;Roychowdhury and Sletten 2012). Several recent papers propose two more-precise proxies for managers' private negative information: the dates when firms were first informed of an SEC investigation, and residual short interest (Bao et al 2019;Blackburne and Quinn 2020;Blackburne et al 2021). Our approach builds on these studies by capturing positive as well as negative private information about revenues, a topic central to firm performance and common across many firms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%