Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem

Marks, Stephen P.

doi:10.1086/467925

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…Rather than distinguish between different types of inadvertence, for the most part courts allow juries to impose liability for all of it 11 (see Grady 1988b;1994;2009; see also Arlen & MacLeod 2003 (arguing that in some contexts negligent acts can arise from a defendant's prior failure to have properly invested in expertise).…”

Section: The Reasons For Causal Limitations In Negligence Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Think of substituting an inspection machine for a human inspector. It is primarily nondurable precaution-that is to say, repetitively used precaution-that yields liability for inadvertent negligence (see Grady 1988b;1994;2009). A substitute durable precaution can reduce the need for advertence and thus reduce expected liability.…”

Section: The Policy Purposes Of the "Reasonable-foresight" Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…One purpose is to avoid overprecaution when the actor was unsure what due care required or when courts can make errors (see Grady 1983;Calfee and Craswell 1984;Craswell and Calfee 1986;Marks 1994;Miceli 1996;Dari-Mattiacci 2005b;Tabbach 2008). Yet, the cause-in-fact limitation also plays an important role when no one could mistake what due care requires, for instance, when actors fail to stop for red lights, fail to remove sponges before closing patients, or fail to amputate the proper limb (cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Causation and foreseeability

Grady¹

2013

Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts

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Section: The Reasons For Causal Limitations In Negligence Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Policy Purposes Of the "Reasonable-foresight" Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Causation and foreseeability

Grady¹

2013

Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts

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“…In section 2 we define most of our terms, lay out our example, and discuss the doctrines 3 Calabresi (1965) noted that fault based liability rules ignore the value of deterring faultless accidents. For criticism of the modeling of liability rules on various grounds, including properties B and C, see Grady (1989), Kahan (1989), Marks (1994), Burrows (1999) and Wright (2002). See Marks (1994) and Miceli (1996) for commentary on Grady (1989).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative Vigilance: A Simple Guide

Feldman

Singh

2008

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractIn this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties' degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table.

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“…Since the captain's drowning probably would have occurred even if the barge had been equipped with lifebuoys, the plaintiff lost her negligence lawsuit, on causation grounds. This one-sided intervening causation scenario, in which the defendant's care depends on an intervention that determines whether care will be effective, is common in the negligence cases, and has been examined from an economic perspective in Shavell (1980), Landes & Posner (1983), Grady (1983), Kahan (1989), Marks (1994), and Hylton & Lin (2013). The Shavell, Landes & Posner, Grady, Kahan, and Marks papers assume that courts have full information.…”

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confidence: 99%