2010
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15479-9_33
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Discrete Event Simulation of QoS of a SCADA System Interconnecting a Power Grid and a Telco Network

Abstract: Abstract. Indicators of Quality of Service (QoS) of Fault Isolation and SystemRestoration (FISR) service, delivered by SCADA system are computed, discussed and correlated to quality indicators of power supplied to customers. In delivering FISR service, SCADA system, Telco network and Power grid act as a whole heterogeneous network. While SCADA system and Telco network can be well represented by means of discrete event simulators. To represent a Power grid a continuous simulator is typically required. In the pa… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Using such a point of view, a situation assessment can be realized considering several technological and organizational aspects and using techniques and methods specific to each facility. In the following Sections, some particular events/infrastructures will be described/analysed to better understand the holistic impact evaluation: • Management of alarms, usually collected using SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) software and then shown to operators in order to support decisions; • Management of physical security information, for detecting unauthorized accesses to specific areas, also using data mining algorithms; • Evaluation of the Quality of Services (QoS) toward customers of the infrastructure, using simulators for analysing transients and outages after the fault [4,5], such as load-flow simulation for power grids or NS-2 [5], OMNET++ [27] and Netbed [29] for telecommunication networks; • Detection/spreading of cyber-attacks [1,3,6,18,23,25,30], especially worms and viruses spreading, such as Red-Code [32], Stuxnet [10] or Duqu [28] worm, through mathematical representation, such as the two-factor models; • Use of information coming from international and national agencies, such as CERTs and other institutions, to integrate cyber-related data coming out from other infrastructures.…”
Section: Holistic Cyber Impact Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using such a point of view, a situation assessment can be realized considering several technological and organizational aspects and using techniques and methods specific to each facility. In the following Sections, some particular events/infrastructures will be described/analysed to better understand the holistic impact evaluation: • Management of alarms, usually collected using SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) software and then shown to operators in order to support decisions; • Management of physical security information, for detecting unauthorized accesses to specific areas, also using data mining algorithms; • Evaluation of the Quality of Services (QoS) toward customers of the infrastructure, using simulators for analysing transients and outages after the fault [4,5], such as load-flow simulation for power grids or NS-2 [5], OMNET++ [27] and Netbed [29] for telecommunication networks; • Detection/spreading of cyber-attacks [1,3,6,18,23,25,30], especially worms and viruses spreading, such as Red-Code [32], Stuxnet [10] or Duqu [28] worm, through mathematical representation, such as the two-factor models; • Use of information coming from international and national agencies, such as CERTs and other institutions, to integrate cyber-related data coming out from other infrastructures.…”
Section: Holistic Cyber Impact Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The case study considers three interconnected infrastructures: a medium voltage power grid controlled by a SCADA network and connected to a generalpurpose telecommunications network. Interested readers are referred to [2] for details about the interconnected infrastructures. Figure 6 shows a portion of the medium voltage power grid.…”
Section: Case Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The design of the PT and the inference rules used to calculate the risk prediction from the information about the status of interdependent CIs is out of the scope of this work, as there are already several works dealing with this. For further information please refer to [11][12][13][14][15][16].…”
Section: Micie Overall System Architecturementioning
confidence: 99%