Discretionary bonuses and turnover

Ekinci, Emre

doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2019.05.003

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Let r i denote the worker's turnover decision, where r i = r if the worker is retained by the incumbent firm in period 2 and r i = nr if not. The incumbent firm's period-2 gross payoff is 29 See, for example, Kahn [2013] and Ekinci [2019] who take the same approach to model labor mobility. 30 This evaluation captures any characteristics of the worker's work environment that we do not model, such as the worker's relationships with her co-workers, nonpecuniary benefits of the job and the social status granted by the job.…”

Section: Iii(i) Model Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that since the rival firm makes zero profits if it does not hire the worker, we simplify the notation by dropping r i from ΠR2 ( d i , V i1) .35 See alsoKahn [2013] andEkinci [2019] who obtain similar expressions for the incumbent firm's wage offer.© 2023 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This is a standard result in models in which firms compete against each other to hire a worker in the initial period and the period-1 employer earns rents from retaining the worker in subsequent periods (e.g.,DeVaro and Waldman [2012];Ekinci [2019]). © 2023 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*

Ekinci,

Wehrheim

2023

The J Industrial Economics

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This article studies how firing costs affect the productivity of knowledge workers. We develop a holdup model in which workers are essential to knowledge transfer between firms and show that if the worker's knowledge stock is sufficiently transferable to competing firms, an increase in firing costs inhibits the firm's ability to hold up the worker and thereby leads to higher effort. We consider the passage of the wrongful discharge laws in the US as an exogenous increase in firing costs and test our theory using data on patents filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

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Section: Iii(i) Model Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*

Ekinci,

Wehrheim

2023

The J Industrial Economics

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“…Some organizations offer retention and performance bonuses for fundraisers (Joslyn, 2019). Bonuses that convey favorable information about the employee job match have been found to negatively correlate with employee turnover (Ekinci, 2019). Compensation (and benefits) investments of various kinds by organizations lessened turnover in a variety of studies (Osterman, 1987; Park et al, 1994; Powell et al, 1994); bonuses for fundraisers may be intended to serve this purpose but the outcomes are untested in the literature.…”

Section: Position Attributes Job Tenure and Turnover Intentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Turnover intention and job tenure of US fundraisers

Shaker

Rooney

Nathan

et al. 2022

Journal of Philanthropy and Marketing

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Fundraisers secure financial resources that organizations need to achieve their missions. Raising money, particularly large gifts, can follow years of relationship building with individual donors. When fundraisers leave these efforts can be set back substantially, making fundraiser turnover particularly worrisome and worthy of exploration. This analysis addressed the issue with US survey data (n = 1663) and examinination of three research questions. What are the job tenure and intent to leave of fundraisers? How is fundraiser job tenure affected by intent to leave? What relationships do job tenure and intent to leave have with fundraisers' individual demographics, position attributes, and organizational characteristics? We found that the study participants had current mean job tenures of 3.6 years (median = 2 years) and mean tenures across their fundraising jobs of 3.9 years (median = 3 years). Twenty percent intended to leave their organization and 7% intended to leave fundraising within the next year. Of the tested variables, salary consistently had the largest effects and was the most significant. Older and more experienced fundraisers had longer tenures. The study provides nuanced information about fundraisers' jobrelated behaviors, includes careful attention to theory and related research, and presents specific ideas for organizational interventions for increasing fundraiser tenure.

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“…First, a worker's salary and bonuses change over time even if the worker remains at the same job level. Second, pay variables, particularly bonuses, can be associated with higher future compensation through signaling future promotions (Fuchs, 2015;Ekinci, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlates of Turnover: Salary and Bonuses

Ekinci¹

2022

isarder

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Purpose–This paper investigates how salaries and bonus payments are related to turnover. Design/methodology/approach–The wealth maximization hypothesis posits that turnover is negatively related to the worker’s expected future earnings at the current firm. Thus, salary and bonuses should be related to turnover to the extent they provide information about the worker’s future earnings at the firm. To evaluate this hypothesis, this paper uses data coming from the personnel records of a medium-sized US firm in the financial services industry. Results–The regression results show that pay variables are serially correlated and they signal future promotions in the firm. Thus, both salaries and bonuses provide information about the worker’s future earnings through these two channels. Further, as predicted by the wealth maximization hypothesis, both salaries and bonuses are related to turnover. In particular, the results show that the growth rate of salary and bonus size (as well as earning a bonus in the current year) are negatively related to turnover.Discussion–The findings of this study underscore the importance of pay variables on turnover behavior. While most existing studies focus on salaries, thereby ignoring bonuses, the current analysis shows that bonus payments are an important determinant of turnover. Hence, in addition to providing workers with effort incentives, the retention function of bonuses should be taken into account for designing optimal compensation schemes.

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Discretionary bonuses and turnover

Cited by 7 publications

References 46 publications

Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*

Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*

Turnover intention and job tenure of US fundraisers

Correlates of Turnover: Salary and Bonuses

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