Discrimination

Abstract

The conceptualization and moral analysis of discrimination constitutes a burgeoning theoretical field, with a number of open problems and a rapidly developing literature. A central problem is how to define discrimination, both in its most basic direct sense and in the most prominent variations. A plausible definition of the basic sense of the word understands discrimination as disadvantageous differential treatment of two groups that is in some respect caused by the properties that distinguish the groups, but open questions remain on whether discrimination should be restricted to concern only particular groups, as well as on whether it is best conceived as a descriptive or a moralized concept. Furthermore, since this understanding limits direct discrimination to cases of differential treatment, it requires that we be able to draw a clear distinction between equal and differential treatment, a task that is less simple than it may appear, but that is helpful in clarifying indirect discrimination and statistical discrimination. The second major problem in theorizing discrimination is explaining what makes discrimination morally wrong. On this issue, there are four dominant contemporary answers: the valuational and expressive disrespect accounts, which hold that discrimination is wrong when and if the discriminator misestimates or expresses a misestimate of the moral status of the discriminatee; the unfairness account, which holds that discrimination is wrong when and if the discriminator unfairly increases inequality of opportunity; and the harm account, which holds that discrimination is wrong when and if the discriminator harms the discriminatee. Each of these accounts, however, faces important challenges in simultaneously providing a persuasive theoretical account and matching our intuitions about cases of impermissible discrimination.

Künstliche Intelligenz und ethische Verantwortung

“…Zu ihnen zählen an Menschenwürde und Missachtung orientierte Ansätze der Diskriminierungstheorie ( Khaitan 2015, 6-8), auch wenn nicht immer der Begriff »Würde« verwendet wird. Sie sehen eine Differenzierung als falsch an, wenn die diskriminierende Person den moralischen Wert der diskriminierten Person falsch, vor allem als niedriger, einschätzt oder wenn die diskriminierende Person eine falsche Einschätzung zum Ausdruck bringt, also so handelt, als ob die diskriminierte Person einen geringeren moralischen Wert hat (Thomsen 2017). Baer (2009) sieht Gleichheitsbedürfnisse nicht allein durch Gleichheitsvorstellungen, sondern besser auch durch Bezugnahme auf Freiheit und Würde befriedigt, da sie als Schutzschild gegen kollektivistische Stereotypisierung dienen.…”

Algorithmic Discrimination From the Perspective of Human Dignity

“…6-8), even if the term "dignity" is not always used. They consider a differentiation to be wrong if the discriminating person assesses the moral value of the discriminated person wrongly, in particular as lower, or if the discriminating person expresses a wrong assessment, i.e., acts as if the discriminated person has a lower moral value (Thomsen, 2017).…”

The Association between Perceived Discrimination and Mental Health of Wage Workers with Disabilities: Findings from the Panel Survey of Employment for the Disabled 2016–2018

“…Discrimination is one of the major obstacles to achieving social integration and can be defined as the unfair or biased treatment of particular individuals or groups [ 13 ]. According to previous studies, discrimination can have a negative impact on living a healthy life, because it is psychologically and mentally harmful.…”