1983
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781139052108
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Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics

Abstract: The most common mode of analysis in economic theory is to assume equilibrium. Yet, without a proper theory of how economies behave in disequilibrium, there is no foundation for such a practice. The necessary step in proposing a foundation is the formulation of a theory of stability, and in this 1984 book, Professor Fisher is primarily concerned with this subject, although disequilibrium behavior itself is analyzed. The author first undertakes a review of the existing literature on the stability of general equi… Show more

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Cited by 291 publications
(121 citation statements)
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“…Some relatively recent attempts to formalize this idea have appeared in Fisher (1981Fisher ( , 1983) -see also Fisher and Saldanha (1982), as well as Stahl and Fisher (1988). That work, however, typically assumes that all agents trade at a common price vector, and asks when awareness of disequilibrium will lead that price vector to change.…”
Section: Interactive Opportunity Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Some relatively recent attempts to formalize this idea have appeared in Fisher (1981Fisher ( , 1983) -see also Fisher and Saldanha (1982), as well as Stahl and Fisher (1988). That work, however, typically assumes that all agents trade at a common price vector, and asks when awareness of disequilibrium will lead that price vector to change.…”
Section: Interactive Opportunity Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With this in mind, say that the allocation mechanism f (ν, i, θ) is multilaterally strategyproof if, for each ν ∈ D, no finite coalition C ⊂ N with (potential) types θ i ∈ Θ can find "manipulative" typesθ i ∈ Θ and net trade vectors t i ∈ R G (i ∈ C) satisfying i∈C t i = 0 as well as f (ν, i,θ i ) + t i ∈ P θ (f (ν, i, θ i )) for all i ∈ C. 41 Considering the case when #C = 1 and so t i = 0, it is obvious that multilateral strategyproofness entails (individual) strategyproofness.…”
Section: Multilateral Strategy Proofnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…an unexplained effect that disrupts the equilibrium state from outside. Second, it is claimed that this kind of economic theorizing is concerned only with the price system's capacity to return to the state of general equilibrium after exogenous shocks of whatever origin (Fisher 1983). …”
Section: Novelty and Dynamic Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This requires the construction of a model for price formation out of equilibrium, a process that is called tatonnement. Such models suggest that there are many situations where prices will fail to converge to equilibrium [31].…”
Section: Limited Scopementioning
confidence: 99%