Disgust, Anger, and Aggression: Further Tests of the Equivalence of Moral Emotions

Abstract

People often report disgust toward moral violations. Some perspectives posit that this disgust is indistinct from anger. Here, we replicate and extend recent work suggesting that disgust and anger toward moral violations are in fact distinct in terms of the situations in which they are activated and their correspondence with aggressive sentiments. We tested three hypotheses concerning emotional responses to moral violations: (1) disgust is associated with lower-cost, indirectly aggressive motives (e.g., gossip and social exclusion), whereas anger is associated with higher-cost, directly aggressive motives (e.g., physical violence); (2) disgust is higher toward violations affecting others than it is toward violations affecting the self, and anger is higher toward violations affecting the self than it is toward violations affecting others; and (3) abilities to inflict costs on or withhold benefits from others (measured via physical strength and physical attractiveness, respectively) relate to anger, but not to disgust. These hypotheses were tested in a within-subjects study in which 233 participants came to the lab twice and reported their emotional responses and aggressive sentiments toward self-targeting and other-targeting moral violations. Participants' upper body strength and physical attractiveness were also measured with a dynamometer and photograph ratings, respectively. The first two hypotheses were supported-disgust (but not anger) was related to indirect aggression whereas anger (but not disgust) was related to direct aggression, and disgust was higher toward other-targeting violations whereas anger was higher toward self-targeting violations. However, physical strength and physical attractiveness were unrelated to anger or disgust or to endorsements of direct or indirect aggression.

Morality is relative: Anger, disgust, and aggression as contingent responses to sibling versus acquaintance harm.

“…In a series of preregistered studies, we repeatedly replicated and extended prior work rooted in the premise that natural selection has shaped emotional reactions to moral transgressions to contingently track the fitness incentives of direct aggression. It should come as little surprise that Molho et al's (2017) findings proved generally robust, given that their original studies were also publicly archived, and have been largely conceptually replicated in a recent preregistered study (Tybur et al, 2019). Replications which incorporate straightforward theoretical extensions, as we have pursued here, hold particular promise in building a cumulative science.…”

“…As anticipated, they found that immoral harms to the self elicited greater anger, which in turn predicted greater motivation to directly aggress against the transgressor, than did the same harms inflicted on an acquaintance. Conversely, transgressions against acquaintances evoked greater feelings of disgust, and disgust was positively correlated with inclinations to indirectly aggress (for a preregistered conceptual replication, see Tybur et al, 2019).…”

Direct Punishment and Indirect Reputation-Based Tactics to Intervene Against Offenses

“…While anger is associated with approach-oriented, aggressive behaviors (68,118,119), disgust has been seen as motivating social avoidance (95,117,120) and efforts to signal condemnation to third parties (93,121). Consistent with these ideas, multiple vignette studies have shown that anger in response to offenses is specifically associated with inclinations to punish offenders directly, via physical and verbal confrontation (92,93,122). In contrast, moral disgust in response to the same offenses is associated with inclinations to punish offenders indirectly, via gossip and ostracism.…”

Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences

“…While anger is associated with approach-oriented, aggressive behaviours [69,118,119], disgust has been seen as motivating social avoidance [96,117,120] and efforts to signal condemnation to third parties [94,121]. Consistent with these ideas, multiple vignette studies have shown that anger in response to offences is specifically associated with inclinations to punish offenders directly, via physical and verbal confrontation [93,94,122]. By contrast, moral disgust in response to the same offences is associated with inclinations to punish offenders indirectly, via gossip and ostracism.…”