Dispositions and Their Intentions

Abstract

-Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of realityi.e., dispositions -are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool: it was introduced in order to help specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition.

Pantheism, Omnisubjectivity, and the Feeling of Temporal Passage

“…6 Martin and Pfeifer (1986) argue that many standard accounts of intentionality fail to distinguish intentional mental properties from allegedly non-intentional dispositional physical properties. See also (Borghini 2009;Heil 2003Heil , 2012Heil , 2016Martin 2007;Molnar 2003, chp. 3;Place 1996).…”