Disproving the Coase Theorem?

Halpin, Andrew

doi:10.1017/s0266267107001514

Cited by 19 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…As such, adopting some form of stringent tax laws can as well force proponents of virtual currencies to thirst more for better energy sources, or develop greener pathways to mining energy consumption. While the Pigouvian efforts may have been faulted by scholars like Coase [96], others like Halpin [97] and Chen [98] have further shrugged off Coase's claims. As described by [39], environmental treaties support enforcing and acting on negative externalities, this is why the so-called "polluters pay" is surviving in Europe.…”

Section: Icelandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opinions on Sustainability of Smart Cities in the Context of Energy Challenges Posed by Cryptocurrency Mining

et al. 2019

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Next to climate change on the list of challenges faced by humankind in today’s technological age is energy management. While “smart” ideas continue to gather momentum as some of the ways earmarked to combat the menace of a changing climate, coupled with efficient management of energy, research and development in the blockchain is not retracting, recently giving rise to digital currencies capable of fueling massive energy consumption via mining of “crypto-coins”. Given that sustainability is a crucial goal in the design of smart cities nowadays, there are currently no assurances of sustainable cities where cryptocurrency mining is at full scale. Nevertheless, alternative energy sources may come to the rescue in no distant time. In this paper, we contextualize energy-use in smart cities through mining of virtual currencies, in order to predict whether or not smart cities can truly be sustainable if crypto-mining is sustained. An attempt is also made to emphasize the possible ways of reducing energy use and all activities involving digital currencies by seeking to replace “Proof of Work” (PoW) with improved alternatives.

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Section: Icelandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opinions on Sustainability of Smart Cities in the Context of Energy Challenges Posed by Cryptocurrency Mining

et al. 2019

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“…A. Halpin (2007) points out the need for restrictions on a person's options in addition to restrictions concerning information and transaction costs. Furthermore, coalitional games with empty cores present obstacles to efficiency, as argue V. Aivazian and J. Callen (1981) and V. Aivazian, J. Callen, and I. Lipnowski (1987).…”

Section: Suppose Thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does collective rationality entail efficiency?

Weirich¹

2009

Logic Journal of IGPL

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Collective rationality in its ordinary sense is rationality's extension to groups. It does not entail efficiency by definition. Showing that it entails efficiency requires a normative argument. Game theorists treating cooperative games generally assume that collective rationality entails efficiency, but formulating the reasoning that leads individuals to efficiency, and verifying the rationality of its steps, presents challenging philosophical issues. This paper constructs a framework for addressing those issues and reaches some preliminary results about the prospects of rational agents achieving efficiency in coalitional games. It concludes that only under strong idealizations does collective rationality entail efficiency. 1Welfare economics formulates idealizations, such as perfect competition, under which markets yield efficient allocations of goods. In a similar spirit, this essay formulates idealizations under which efficiency emerges in coalitional games. These are games in which players may form coalitions and act jointly. Many theorists propose the standard of efficiency for solutions to cooperative games, including coalitional games, and so suggest that collectively rational players achieve an efficient outcome. 1 However, this essay finds that in a coalitional game, the players' collective rationality in its ordinary sense does not ensure efficiency even if the game satisfies standard idealizations. The essay therefore strengthens standard idealizations to make collective rationality generate efficiency. To obtain efficiency, it adds the idealization that players rationally prepare for their game.The first section explains why, in coalitional games, collectively rational players may not achieve efficiency. It describes collective rationality and efficiency, and shows that although collective rationality aims for efficiency, obstacles often prevent its attainment.The second section examines collective rationality's requirement that players achieve a solution in a coalitional game. A solution assigns strategies to players so that the strategies are jointly rational, and consequently form an equilibrium among players' incentives. So that equilibrium is attainable, this section takes equilibrium as strategic equilibrium, a type of equilibrium that does not require all players to pursue all incentives-that is impossible in some coalitional games. It requires only that players pursue compelling incentives. Players who meet this equilibrium standard may not achieve efficiency, however. So collective rationality's requiring a solution does not in general ensure efficiency. The final section shows that a coalitional game's solution yields an efficient outcome if the players rationally prepare for their game. Prior to their game, fully rational players coordinate their pursuit of incentives so that it ensures 1 See, for example, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944: Sec. 4) and John Nash (1950). 2 efficiency in the game. Because their rational preparation is a suitable idealization, collective rationality...

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“…See Spiller (2013). 24 See, for example,Halpin (2007),Stigler (1977), andUsher (1998).25 The Trinity House, the authority responsible for chartering lighthouses, was incorporated in 1514 during Henry VIII's reign. Interestingly, the dawning of private lighthouses and the increase of public lighthouses run by the Trinity House corresponds in time to the uprising of the Parliament as the center of the British politics.…”

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confidence: 99%

Coase and the Transaction Cost Approach to Regulation

Moszoro

Spiller

2015

SSRN Journal

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Early economic research on natural monopoly regulation focused on market failurepricing tariffs and externalities. While Coase's multi-tariff marginal cost pricing became the standard, his approach to externality regulation as a contractual issue shifted the debate to transaction costs, but failed to recognize the associated political hazards. The renewed approach to regulation is more cognizant of the interplay of transaction costs and political hazards. In this paper, we show that regulatory rigidities arise as a response to political hazards of opportunistic expropriation and challenges from interested third parties to public agents.

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Disproving the Coase Theorem?

Cited by 19 publications

References 28 publications

Opinions on Sustainability of Smart Cities in the Context of Energy Challenges Posed by Cryptocurrency Mining

Opinions on Sustainability of Smart Cities in the Context of Energy Challenges Posed by Cryptocurrency Mining

Does collective rationality entail efficiency?

Coase and the Transaction Cost Approach to Regulation

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