Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy

Cormac, Rory

doi:10.1177/0047117816659532

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Without relentless contention the known unknowns we now study would have remained epistemologically nigh unapproachable unknown unknowns (Daase and Kessler, 2007; see also Stampnitzky, 2020 and Walters, 2015: 289). The challenge here is to explore not just what is missing but also what is misleading (Cormac, 2017: 170). Our ability to sift through the debris and contestation was enhanced by holding 15 round tables with legal experts, investigative journalists, political stakeholders and NGOs (Airwars, Amnesty, PAX and Open State Foundation) working on the Hawija case between 2017 and 2020.…”

Section: Concepts: the Epistemic Politics Of Remote Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As discussed above, however, foregoing the quest to establish intent at all costs may dampen these risks. Moreover, while ‘reading back from “the facts” in order to decipher who is trying to produce ignorance has severe limits’ (Rappert, 2012: 55), too much is at stake not to nevertheless try (Cormac, 2017: 170). Our objective in this academic article, therefore, is not to ‘uncover a singular, hidden truth’ (Walters and Luscombe, 2020 cited by De Goede et al, 2020: 4).…”

Section: Concepts: the Epistemic Politics Of Remote Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Gould

Stel

2021

Security Dialogue

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How must we understand and conceptualize the rationales and repercussions of remote warfare? This article contributes to scholarship on the ontology of remote war by analysing how Dutch officials engage with responsibility for the bombardment of an Islamic State weapons factory in Hawija, Iraq in 2015 under Operation Inherent Resolve. It observes that the main feature of Dutch officials’ accounts of Hawija is their diverse claims to not knowing about civilian casualties. Official narratives shifted from denial to secrecy to strategic ignorance. Bridging work on secrecy from the field of critical security studies with work on strategic ‘unknowing’ from ignorance studies, we propose a new take on the Foucauldian notion of ‘regimes of truth’. The regimes of truth that emerge to justify shifts to remote warfare – that it is riskless, precise and caring for civilian others – rely not merely on secrecy and denial but on feigned and imposed ignorance about casualties. Whereas denial can be disproven and secrecy has an expiration date, ignorance is more elusive and open-ended and hence politically convenient in different ways. Deliberate unknowing does not just postpone investigation and accountability but fundamentally and indefinitely obstructs it and thus sustains the regimes of truth for future remote wars.

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Section: Concepts: the Epistemic Politics Of Remote Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Concepts: the Epistemic Politics Of Remote Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Gould

Stel

2021

Security Dialogue

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“…From sociology, Anthony King has also lately brought quite a critical lens to bear on British Special Forces 30 and increasingly there is developing work in the UK on its relationship with the intelligence realm through covert action. 31 Further afield, there is burgeoning interest in the Nordic region, not only in this intelligence element, but also in the role of special forces and SOF in so-called small states such as Denmark and Sweden. 32 In the United States, SOF focus largely revolves around service schools and think tanks.…”

Section: Traversing the Contemporary Intellectual Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

A dangerous pathway? Toward a theory of special forces

Finlan

2019

Comparative Strategy

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This article explores what is considered by some to be a dangerous pathway: the development of a theory of special forces. The world is now in the third age of special forces and these secret military units are at the forefront of the use of force in international relations. This research identifies a large theory-knowledge gap concerning these military "first responders" for modern nation-states and offers a tentative theory of special forces that goes beyond traditional annihilation/attrition models of war toward a new anaphylaxis model. It makes the case that the theory pathway is not dangerous, but emancipatory.

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‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

Bennett¹

2019

Intelligence and National Security

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Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda's ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military's involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on.

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Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

A dangerous pathway? Toward a theory of special forces

‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

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