Disruptive Disobedience

Abstract

This article addresses a neglected class of cases of civic resistance involving the anonymous and covert disruption of institutions and practices. Such cases have become more commonplace in the first decades of the twenty-first century with the rise of "hacktivism," but they sit uneasily within the traditional conceptual and normative framework of civil disobedience the legitimacy of which is premised on the publicity of dissent and on the willingness of dissenters to accept the legal consequences of their actions. To make sense of these new forms of civic resistance, the article introduces the concept of "disruptive disobedience." It elaborates the concept by contrasting it with other forms of civic resistance, and proposes a moral justification for it by presenting it as a corrective to democratic exclusion. Finally, it tests that justification by applying it to a prominent contemporary case involving Aaron Swartz's illegal download of JSTOR research articles.

The British Academy Brian Barry Prize EssayWhy Is There No Just Riot Theory?

“…Scholars generally recognize justified law breaking if the illegal action is contesting a greater injustice (Celikates 2016, 43; Edyvane and Kulenović 2017, 1361; Markovits 2005, 1898; Rawls 1999, 319; Scheuerman 2015; Shelby 2007, 127). Edyvane and Kulenović argue that law breaking is ‘justified when it functions to disrupt exclusionary practices that contribute to the incapacitation of citizenship’ (2017, 1360). Shelby uses the criterion of ‘intolerable injustice’ as a justification for law breaking and defines it as the ‘constitutional essentials’ in Rawls' basic framework.…”

“… 17 A person tests a law by challenging its validity in court through judicial review. Yet unlike other forms of disobedience, in this instance the citizen agrees to abide by the court's decision (Edyvane and Kulenović 2017, 1360).…”

Why is there no just riot theory?

“…There are crucial differences between rioting and most 19 A person tests a law by challenging its validity in court through judicial review. Yet unlike other forms of disobedience, in this instance the citizen agrees to abide by the court's decision (Edyvane andKulenovic 2017, 1360) 20 Rawls defines civil disobedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to the law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government" (Rawls 1999, 320).…”

“…Scholars generally recognize justified law breaking if the illegal action is contesting a greater injustice (Rawls 1999, 319;Shelby 2007, 127;Scheuerman 2015;Celikates 2016, 43;Edyvane andKulenovic 2017, 1361;Markovits 2005Markovits , 1898 Edyvane 24 Tommie Shelby defines the deviant as "Sharply divergent from widely accepted norms" (Shelby 2007, 128). He considers activities by the ghetto poor such as crime, refusing to work in legitimate jobs, having contempt for authority as legitimate forms of deviance in the face of deeply unjust social arrangements (Shelby 2007, 127-28).…”

“…and Kulenovic argue that law breaking is "justified when it functions to disrupt exclusionary practices that contribute to the incapacitation of citizenship" (Edyvane andKulenovic 2017, 1360). Shelby uses the criterion of "intolerable injustice" as a justification for law breaking and defines it as the "constitutional essentials" in Rawls' basic framework.…”