Disruptive technology and regulatory conundrums: The emerging governance of virtual currencies

Abstract

Regulatory agencies care about their reputation, which helps sustain their authority. As innovation can introduce uncertainty in governance, delaying action or overlooking danger can negatively affect agencies' standing. Aware of these reputation risks, agencies rely on a set of methods to govern the unknown. These methods, we argue, are: (1) categorization, if the innovation is considered identical to known regulatory categories; (2) analogy, if the innovation is considered similar to known categories, and; (3) new categorization, when new classifications are deemed necessary to address the innovation. Each method shapes governance by triggering the application of existing regulations (categorization and analogy), calls for either technical and regulatory fixes (analogy), or calls for broader regulatory undertakings (new categorization). Agencies' choice of methods, we argue, is shaped by concerns over performative reputation (i.e., showing the ability to fulfill core tasks), which in turn is affected by agencies' ability to demonstrate technical rigor (i.e., technical reputation).