The growing adoption of network encryption protocols, like TLS, has altered the scene of monitoring network traffic. With the advent and rapid increase in network encryption mechanisms, typical deep packet inspection systems that monitor network packet payload contents are gradually becoming obsolete, while in the meantime, adversaries abuse the utilization of the TLS protocol to bypass them. In this paper, aiming to understand the botnet ecosystem in the wild, we contact IP addresses known to participate in malicious activities using the JARM tool for active probing. Based on packets acquired from TLS handshakes, server fingerprints are constructed during a time period of 7 months. The fingerprints express servers' responses to a sequence of several ''TLS Client Hello'' messages with different TLS attributes and we investigate if it is feasible to detect suspicious servers and re-identify other similar within blocklists with no prior knowledge of their activities. Based on our study, we can see that fingerprints originating from suspicious servers are repetitive among similarly configured servers. We show that it is important to update fingerprints often or follow a more effective fingerprinting approach, since the overlapping ratio with legitimate servers rises over time.