2022
DOI: 10.1177/00220027221077220
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Dissent Networks, State Repression, and Strategic Clemency for Defection

Abstract: Why do governments severely punish some dissidents while showing mercy to others? This study argues that when constrained by limited information on dissent, states have incentives to cast the net of repression wider by executing not just key dissent actors but also members closely connected to them to ensure demobilization. States also crave information, and granting clemency to defectors who bring in information improves state intelligence. Given that tips have different values, regimes will grant clemency to… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
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